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PREFACE 
This is the 32nd of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries.   Animals  are a 
source of food, more specifically protein for human diets, income, employment and 
possibly foreign exchange. For low income producers, livestock can serve as a store of 
wealth, provide draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means 
of transport. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, 
though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly.  
This working paper explores public policies that would advance pro-poor development 
in the livestock sector, with special attention to organized actors, their interests, and 
the political feasibility of state initiatives.  It focuses on two sub-sectors that involve 
large numbers of small producers: the dairy sector and the alpaca sector.  Emphasis is 
placed on the latter, since there is a greater potential role for Peru’s weak, neo-
liberal state in promoting pro-poor development in the alpaca sector. 
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the author, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its 
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and 
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO. 
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Tasha Fairfield, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.  
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“Since poverty – especially extreme poverty – is concentrated in the rural sector and 
since the majority of those who live in poverty live off the land, it is not possible to 
hive off discussions about agricultural policy from those designed to alleviate 
poverty. The ways in which agricultural policies are designed have an obvious and 
immediate impact on social conditions in rural areas, irrespective of other policies 
that may be pursued.” – Crabtree 2002: 133 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
FAO’s Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative is designed to promote economic 
opportunities and hence improve the standard of living for the rural poor.  The 
organizaions that coordinate the FAO initiative in Peru have chosen to focus initially 
on five regions of the country: Ancash, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Cajamarca, and 
Puno.  These regions share two characteristics that make them ideal for the FAO 
initiative: particularly high poverty rates and a pronounced importance of livestock 
among the economic activities and survival strategies of poor families. 
This report explores public policies that would advance pro-poor development in the 
livestock sector, with special attention to organized actors, their interests, and the 
political feasibility of state initiatives.  It focuses on two sub-sectors that involve large 
numbers of small producers: the dairy sector and the alpaca sector.  Emphasis is 
placed on the latter, since there is a greater potential role for Peru’s weak, neoliberal 
state in promoting pro-poor development in the alpaca sector.   
The dairy sector holds promise for providing economic opportunities for small 
producers.  However, small producers in this sector are poorly organized, and 
politically feasible public policies to promote their interests are limited.  For 
example, the main problem afflicting the sector, according to producers, is the price 
they receive for milk, a realm in which the neoliberal state is highly unlikely to 
intervene.  The most important action the state could take to promote development 
in the dairy sector would be to prevent the dumping of subsidized dairy products in 
the free trade treaty which was under negotiation with the US while research for this 
project was conducted.  Indeed, dairy producers associations had joined forces with 
other traditional agriculture sectors in demanding continued trade protections.   
Peru’s alpaca fiber producers are among the very poorest members of Peruvian 
society.  The alpaca herders, known as alpaqueros, are poorly organized and 
geographically diffuse, a situation that has helped perpetuate domination of the fiber 
sector by three oligopsonic processing industries since their creation in the 1950s.   
These industries have a longstanding reputation for lack of interest in the wellbeing of 
the alpaca herders.  Further, intermediaries capture much of the value in the 
production chain, leaving alpaqueros with very low prices for their fiber.  Past state 
interventions in the fiber sector to correct distortions and increase producer prices 
have failed to improve the situation of the poor herders, as have various NGO 
initiatives, largely due to the political and economic power of the processing 
industries and the intermediaries.  
Current conditions, however, are more promising for improving the wellbeing of the 
alpaqueros.   First, the industries have become extremely concerned over the 
declining quality of alpaca fiber, which threatens the viability of the entire production 
chain.  Improving the quality of fiber requires greater attention to the alpaca herders 
and their animal breeding practices.  Second, a new generation of leaders is emerging 
within the industries who are somewhat more open to working with both the state and 
the alpaqueros for the good of the sector as a whole.   Third, the specialized state 
agency that focuses on the camelid sector, Conacs, has recently emerged as a highly 
professional and proactive agency.  It is spearheading noteworthy efforts to foster 
coordination among the actors in the alpaca fiber production chain, among other 
activities designed to benefit small alpaca herders.  Serious impediments to progress 
remain, yet concrete opportunities now exist. 
This report’s main overarching findings are as follows: 
•  Key public agencies of importance for the livestock sector suffer from politically 
motivated turnover of functionaries, the absence of a professionalized, 
meritocratic bureaucracy, insufficient funding, lack of coordination, and a limited 
capacity to act as regulatory and coordinating agents.  These widespread problems Executive Summary 
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seriously hinder efforts to design and implement effective public policies in the 
livestock sector.  These problems are exacerbated by a weak state presence in 
rural areas, due partially to downsizing that accompanied far-reaching neoliberal 
reforms in the 1990s. 
•  There are few organized actors at the national level capable of advancing the 
interests of small producers.  Peru’s political parties are weak, elitist, volatile, and 
have no stable links to constituencies.  As such they are poor vehicles for 
representation.  Further, there are essentially no strong associations that represent 
the interests of small agriculture and livestock producers at the national level.   
Two partial exceptions are AGALEP, which represents milk producers, and SPAR, 
which organizes alpaca producers; both have emerged only recently as relevant at 
the national level, but they do hold promise for the future. 
•  Decentralization initiated in 2002 has created new institutional spaces for 
participation by the poor in politics and resource allocation.  In practice, however, 
numerous obstacles hinder participation and limit the overall effectiveness of these 
institutions.  Issues that must be addressed before decentralization can lead to 
more equitable development outcomes include problems with the legal framework, 
incomplete implementation of the laws, lack of resources, and under-
representation of traditionally marginalized groups. 
The report recommends several specific public policies that could promote pro-poor 
development.  The most important are as follows:  
•  Securing protections in free trade treaties for the milk sector 
A healthy and expanding Peruvian dairy sector is obviously critical for promoting 
pro-poor development for small milk producers. To protect the sector from cheap 
subsidized imported milk, it would be reasonable for the Peruvian government to 
demand a clause in the US free trade treaty preventing the sale of dairy products 
at prices below those charged for imports from other countries.  Prices any lower 
would reflect US subsidies, not market forces.   
•  Promoting direct marketing of alpaca fiber from producers to the industries. 
Reducing dependence on the intermediaries is in the long-term interest of both 
producers and processing industries, although the intermediary-based marketing 
system has proved very difficult to change.  The state is currently working toward 
this goal through Conacs’ National System for Collection and Commercialization of 
Alpaca Fiber initiative. 
•  Implementing national standards for quality grading of alpaca fiber. 
A uniform standard could make it possible for alpaqueros to gain value-added by 
sorting fiber before sale to the industries, whereas at present, this option is less 
feasible because each industry uses its own classification system.  It also would 
create incentives for producers to improve quality. 
The report also identifies a number of more general strategic entry points for 
improving opportunities for small producers to benefit from expansion in the livestock 
sector.  The most salient of these entry points are detailed below: 
•  Providing support for small producers associations. 
Since small producers must ultimately be protagonists in the political struggle for 
pro-poor development policies, strengthening associations that represent them is 
critical to the success of the FAO initiative.  The international community could 
further this goal through financial support and / or technical assistance for 
producers’ associations. 
•  Providing assistance for small fiber-processing industries. Executive Summary 
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Promotion of small fiber-processing operations would help to create more jobs and 
opportunities in artisan garment production, which would help generate more 
value-added within Peru in the camelid sector.  In the long term, encouraging the 
emergence and consolidation of small fiber-processing industries could help to 
reduce the alpaqueros’ dependence on the three major processing companies and 
to improve producer prices.  International institutions and donors should thus 
consider providing technical training and / or loans for small entrepreneurs 
interested in fiber processing. 
•  Promoting institutionalization and professionalization of state agencies. 
In particular, Conacs’ leadership and personnel must be protected from politically 
motivated replacement.  At present, this agency has made important strides 
toward professionalization, but political pressures could conceivably arise with the 
change of government in 2006.  
•  Providing or pressuring the state to better fund agencies relevant to the livestock 
sector. 
Key public institutions active in the livestock sector, including Conacs and the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Dirección de Crianzas, need greater financial resources if 
they are to more effectively promote pro-poor development.  International actors 
could help by directly proving funding for these entities and / or by pressuring the 
new administration that will take office in 2006 to prioritize these agencies and 
their livestock programs. 
•  Promoting greater coordination among donor projects and between donor projects 
and state agencies. 
Lack of coordination among international institutions that manage or fund 
development projects in Peru, duplication of efforts, and creation of organizations 
parallel to state agencies involved in similar activities are all problems that hinder 
efficiency.  It is recommended that donors and the FAO work closely with existing 
state institutions rather than creating semi-independent project offices, and 
coordinate efforts with international actors already involved with similar projects. 
•  Support for decentralization 
Flaws in the legal framework of decentralization and other problems that have 
arisen in practice must be corrected.  The FAO and other international actors could 
help by calling attention to these issues, among them the importance of increasing 
resource transfers to regional and local governments (contingent on the 
development of capacity at these levels), and the need to clarify the functions of 
the new participatory institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative is 
designed to promote economic opportunities and hence improve the standard of living 
for the rural poor.  The institutions that will administer the FAO initiative in Peru have 
chosen to focus initially on five regions of the country: Ancash, Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica, Cajamarca, and Puno.  These regions share two characteristics that 
make them ideal for the FAO initiative: particularly high poverty rates and a 
pronounced importance of livestock among the economic activities and survival 
strategies of poor families.   
All of the selected regions are located in the Andean highlands (sierra) or plateaus 
(altiplano) and have large populations of indigenous peoples.  As in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, indigenous populations in the Peruvian Andes have been subject to 
socioeconomic exclusion and marginalization ever since the arrival of the Spanish 
conquerors.  In Peru, economic development has been concentrated in the coastal 
lowland regions.  Accordingly, extreme poverty is concentrated in the rural areas of 
the sierra and altiplano.  The national poverty rate in 2000 was 54%, with 15% in 
extreme poverty.  In the rural areas of the sierra, in contrast, 66% lived in poverty and 
30% in extreme poverty (Crabtree 2002: 148).  The selected regions, moreover, have 
some of the highest poverty rates in Peru.  
Poor rural families raise a range of different animals including cows, sheep, pigs, 
goats, alpacas, chickens, and guinea pigs (cuyes). The importance of these species 
varies by region.  Cajamarca, for example, is Peru’s third most important milk 
producing region, and it has an expanding local market for cuyes.  Puno is Peru’s 
principle producer of alpaca fiber.  Livestock is perhaps of greatest importance to 
rural families in Puno, relative to other regions, since much of Puno is altiplano, with 
soil and climactic conditions that do not support a large range of agricultural 
activities.  Ayacucho has important reserves of vicuñas, a wild South American 
camelid that produces highly valued fiber.  And Ancash has a growing business of 
supplying cows to feed lots in Lima, due to its proximity to Peru’s capital. 
These regions display great diversity in terms of their political histories, sociopolitical 
characteristics, and natural resources.  Ayacucho, for example, was particularly 
affected by terrorist violence propagated by the guerrilla movement Sendero 
Luminoso  (Shining Path)  in the 1980s.  In Cajamarca, in contrast, peasant 
organizations successfully prevented Sendero f r o m  e s t a b l i s h i n g  i n r o a d s .   R e g i o n a l  
government institutions and civil society are weak in Puno, whereas Cajamarca’s 
government tends to function better than average. Cajamarca also has a history of 
stronger peasant organizations.  Some of the selected regions have important mining 
resources; the Yanacocha mine in Cajamarca is an important political and economic 
actor.  Other regions such as Puno have fewer natural resources that could generate 
wealth.   
Overall, then, Peru is a highly diverse country. Its regions show tremendous variation 
in terms of the characteristics mentioned above, as well as in geographical and 
climactic conditions that affect production activities.  All of these factors will shape 
the particular policies and initiatives that will be necessary to promote pro-poor 
development in the livestock sector, and any development initiative must take this 
diversity into account.   
This report, however, does not present a detailed analysis of political conditions and 
recommended policies on a region-by-region basis, nor does it offer a systematic 
discussion of each livestock sub-sector relevant to the FAO initiative.  Such endeavors 
are beyond the scope of this study.  Rather, the analysis that follows focuses on the 
milk sector, the camelid sector, and political dynamics at the national level.  Due to 
Puno's importance in the alpaca fiber production chain and the large percentage of its Introduction 
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population whose livelihoods depend on alpacas, the political situation in this region is 
discussed in some detail in an appendix.   
Although both the milk and the camelid sectors involve large numbers of small 
producers, emphasis will be placed on the latter, because of what the author 
perceives as a greater potential role for the state and public policies in promoting 
pro-poor development in the camelid sector.  A specialized state agency that focuses 
on the camelid sector, Conacs, has in recent years spearheaded noteworthy efforts to 
foster coordination among the actors in the alpaca fiber production chain, along with 
other activities designed ultimately to benefit small alpaca herders.  Although these 
efforts are fraught with problems and face severe impediments, they do hold promise 
and merit detailed discussion.    
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows.  Chapter I discusses state policies in 
the era of neoliberalism and public agencies of relevance to small producers in the 
livestock sector.  While the agencies discussed serve as important reference points for 
producers, many of them suffer from problems that hinder their effectiveness in 
promoting pro-poor development.  These include politically motivated turnover of 
functionaries, lack of funding, and limited capacity to intervene in the sector.  
Chapter II examines the national political context in which policy decisions relevant to 
the livestock sector are made.  Section 1 discusses the most salient feature of 
Peruvian politics: a collapsed party system.  Section 2 considers the organized actors 
of relevance to the livestock sector.  Political parties are weak, unstable, and largely 
incapable of representing small producers’ interests.  Civil society, including 
producers’ associations, is also weak.  Section 3 explains the salient aspects of 
decentralization, which was initiated when President Toledo took office in 2001.   
Small producers will be able to take advantage of the new possibilities for 
participation and interest advancement created by decentralization only if numerous 
problems with the legal framework and its implementation can be resolved.  
Chapter III briefly examines the dairy sector.  Small producers in this sector are poorly 
organized, and politically feasible public policies to promote their interests are 
limited.  Small producers interests and those of the processing industries do coincide 
in two realms: promoting continued protection for the milk sector in the context of an 
imminent free trade treaty with the US, and pressuring the state to purchase 
domestically produced milk to supply its food subsidy programs.    
Chapter IV provides a detailed analysis of the alpaca sector, with an emphasis on the 
fiber sector.  The main actors in the fiber sector and their interests are discussed in 
detail, including the powerful fiber-processing industries, state agencies active in the 
sector, and producers’ associations.  Some convergence of interests does exist, 
although impediments to pro-poor development remain.   Prospects for improving the 
welfare of alpaca herders through various initiatives related to the meat sector are 
also discussed.  Appendix B provides an overview of the difficult political situation in 
Puno, where the majority of Peru’s small alpaca herders are found.  Any initiative 
designed to improve the situation of herder families will have to take into account 
numerous structural obstacles to success in this region.  
This report concludes with a discussion of strategic entry points in Chapter V.  Various 
courses of action are suggested that could directly or indirectly help improve 
opportunities for small producers in the livestock sector.  Among the 
recommendations are providing support for small producers’ associations, promoting 
institutionalization and professionalization of state agencies, and attempting to foster 
coordination among actors involved in development efforts. 
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CHAPTER I: THE STATE AND THE LIVESTOCK SECTOR 
Section 1: Agriculture, Public Policy and the State in the Past 
Decade 
In the 1990s, Peru, like much of Latin America, underwent a pronounced move away 
from state intervention toward neoliberalism, a shift that represents a dramatic break 
with the past.  In 1969, Peru experienced a major agrarian reform that broke up large 
haciendas and distributed land to producers in the form of various types of 
cooperatives.  For a decade thereafter, the state was deeply involved in the 
agricultural sector.  Its activities included setting prices for agricultural goods, control 
of marketing, and providing cheap credit, subsidized inputs, and extension services to 
producers (Crabtree 2002: 151, Hunefeldt 1997: 109).   
The shift away from interventionism began with the profound economic crises of the 
1980s, which resulted in part from the failure of agrarian reform.  Under President 
Belaunde, cooperatives were dissolved, and various steps were taken toward reducing 
the presence of the state in the agricultural sector.  That process accelerated under 
President Fujimori, who initiated dramatic economic stabilization and liberalization 
programs after his election in 1990.   
Fujimori’s reforms included price liberalization, closure of the Banco Agrario, which 
had provided cheap credit to producers, and generalized reductions of tariffs (with 
some compensatory protections for specific products such as milk).  Crabtree (2002: 
140) notes that the agricultural sector as a whole was low on Fujimori’s list of 
priorities; the administration focused instead on promoting more dynamic sectors of 
the economy, such as mining.  As Fujimori worked to curtail state intervention, the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Minag) took on a role subordinate to that of the Ministry of 
Economics and Finance (Crabtree 2002: 138).  Moreover, Minag was radically 
downsized from 23,000 employees in 1990 to only 5,000 in 1996.  Crabtree (2002: 141) 
asserts that this retrenchment was carried out in an ad hoc manner, with little prior 
planning.  Numerous programs were terminated or simply handed over to the private 
sector.     
While some of Fujimori’s reforms, such as price liberalization, may have acted to the 
advantage of agricultural producers, liberalization in the 1990s seems to have 
benefited primarily the agro-exporters on Peru’s irrigated coast.  Small producers in 
the Andean highlands have been increasingly marginalized.  For example, increased 
imports have altered consumption patterns and undermined markets for traditional 
foods produced in the Andes.  The end of state-subsidized credit also created 
hardships for small producers.  Overall, Crabtree (2002: 131) concludes that 
“liberalization has probably brought more losers than winners… many peasant 
producers have been relegated further to the margins of the economic system.”  
President Toledo, elected in 2001 after the dramatic political demise of Fujimori, has 
adhered to a similar neoliberal policy framework, despite some rhetorical 
acknowledgements of and tactical concessions to growing discontent with that model 
(Barr 2003).  In recent years, for example, Toledo has worked avidly in favor of free 
trade, signing agreements with Mercosur and entering into negotiations with the US.   
In this continuing neoliberal context, there are significant limits on what the state 
may do to promote development, let alone pro-poor development, in the livestock 
sector.  Many interventionist tools used in the past are no longer acceptable and had 
never achieved much success anyway.  The state has withdrawn from directly 
providing services to producers and now engages in more nebulous “promotional” 
activities.  New state roles include promoting alliances among actors in production 
chains, providing information services, and coordinating the efforts and activities of Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
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multiple private economic actors.  For example, many state ministries including Minag 
and the Ministry of Production have adopted methodologies focused on production 
chains (cadenas productivas and cadenas de valor), although their specific approaches 
appear to vary significantly.
1 
The major problem with this new approach is that the state has little capacity to act 
as a regulatory and coordinating agent.  Behind this problem lies the fact that Peru, 
like most other Latin American countries, has historically had a very weak state.   
Fujimori strengthened some public institutions, such as the Ministry of Economics and 
Finances and the Ministry of Foreign  Commerce and Tourism.  Yet other institutions 
have remained extremely weak; Minag is among the worst of these.  Overall, Peru is 
far from possessing the lean, strong and efficient state now advocated by 
international agencies and academics alike. 
The specific afflictions of state agencies are numerous.  First is the problem of 
instability.  Ministers, for example, change frequently, even during the term of a 
single president.  And when a minister changes, there is often significant turnover of 
personnel within the institution in question, sometimes including members of 
technical and professional teams.  Such rotation of public officials creates instability 
of priorities and projects within the ministries, as well as tremendous loss of 
efficiency and skills. 
A second and related problem is the fact that Peru has no established professional 
civil service.
2  Public officials for the most part are not chosen through open 
competitions based on merit.  Rather, job patronage is rampant; politicians seek to 
reward their political supporters with appointments in state agencies.  Consequently, 
public institutions often cannot count on an adequate level of human capital; in fact, 
many informants complain of the low quality of public functionaries.  Further, in the 
absence of a professional civil service, organized interests within society may be able 
to gain excessive influence over institutional agendas.   
In addition to the above problems, there is a debilitating lack of coordination both 
among and within state agencies.  In the agricultural sector, for example, numerous 
different agencies handle projects that should either be closely coordinated or 
handled by a single institution.  Instead, the various efforts often appear to be diffuse 
and often ineffectual (Int. 10).  Added to the mix are a plethora of international donor 
and NGO development projects that often duplicate the efforts of state agencies. 
Decentralization in Peru, an ongoing process initiated in 2002, holds promise for 
making the state more responsive to its citizens, but it also poses the risk of creating 
even greater coordination problems among public institutions.  Ministries are now 
required to transfer a range of different programs and functions to the regional 
governments, yet regional governments in most cases lack the capacity and 
experience to effectively manage them.  These problems are compounded by the 
complicated and occasionally self-contradictory legal framework of decentralization 
(see Chapter II).  
Finally, it must be noted that the state in general has a very limited presence in the 
rural zones where the poorest small producers are located, particularly in the 
aftermath of state retrenchment and downsizing of Minag in the 1990s.  Even if the 
decentralization reforms succeed in dispersing human and financial resources away 
from Lima, where they have been heavily concentrated for decades, it will take 
significant time and effort to strengthen the capacity and extend the reach of regional 
and local public institutions into the countryside.  
                                                 
1While research for this project was being conducted, Congress was reportedly analyzing a law that would create a uniform 
framework for the production chain methodology to promote standardization and coordination among the various different 
ministries working with this concept (OPA 3, Int. 30). 
2The lament “no hay carrera publica” was frequent among informants.  Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
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Section 2: State Agencies Involved in the Livestock Sector 
A complicated array of public institutions are involved in the livestock sector.  The 
most important of these are Minag and various institutions that are ostensibly 
responsible to it.  Minag and its sub-agencies are discussed in detail below, with 
special attention to their institutional capacities.  In addition, various other ministries 
manage projects of relevance to the livestock sector, including the Ministry of 
Production, the Presidency of the Ministerial Council (Presidencia del Consejo de 
Ministros) and the Ministry of Foreign Commerse and Tourism.  Regional governments 
also manage their own special projects that occasionally focus on livestock.  These 
ministries and regional government projects will be mentioned where relevant in the 
following chapters, but are not discussed in detail here.  
Ministerio de Agricultura (Minag)  
The Ministry of Agriculture encompasses a large number of line agencies, special 
projects with administrative autonomy, and specialized semi-autonomous sub-
organizations known as Organismos Publicos Descentralizados (OPDs) (See Figure 1).
3  
In addition to their central offices, each OPD has its own regional office.  Further, 
Minag has deconcentrated agencies known as Direcciones Regionales Agrarias (DRAs) 
in each region that coordinate among the OPD offices and with the regional 
g o v e r n m e n t s .   A s  o f  2 0 0 3 ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  DRAs were transferred to the regional 
governments, in accord with decentralization laws.
4  The DRAs replicate the basic line-
agency structure of Minag at the regional level; for example, each has its own 
Dirección de Información Agraria and Dirección de Promoción Agraria.  
 
                                                 
3It should be noted that Minag has reportedly proposed a restructuring initiative, which was under debate but had not yet 
been made public while research for this project was being conducted (OPA 3). 
4As I understand it, the DRAs are now administratively subordinate to and financially dependent on the regional governments 
(Int. 19, Int. 6).  I am not clear if the DGAs also receive some funds directly from Minag.  Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
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Percentages of Minag’s total 2003 budget (approximately USD 192.5) allotted to each special project and OPD are shown.  Minag’s central administrative offices received 
40% of the total budget.  
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Dirección General de 
Promoción Agraria  
Dirección General de 
Información Agraria 
Oficina General de 
Planificación Agraria 
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Normative Framework and Decentralization.  Like other state agencies, Minag is in 
the process of withdrawing from service provision to producers.  Such changes were of 
course part of the general reorientation of the state brought about during the 1990s 
with neoliberal reform.  However, informants assert that Minag’s most recent move 
away from service provision was initiated by interim president Paneagua with Supreme 
Decree 017 in 2001, which formalizes the ministries’ new emphasis on promotional 
and coordinating activities.
5  Moreover, with decentralization, service provision 
functions will fall under the mandate of either the regional governments or private 
actors.  
Instead of service provision, like various other state agencies, Minag is now attempting 
to articulate private sector economic activities and promote coordination and 
alliances within production chains (cadenas productivas).  Specific institutional 
objectives listed in Decree 017 include strengthening the organization of producers 
around production chains, “fomenting” technical innovation and “facilitating” 
technical assistance for producers, establishing information systems to help private 
sector agents make efficient decisions, and “facilitating” articulation of small 
agriculture with both internal and external markets (El Peruano 2001: 201532).   
Among the production chains that Minag plans to prioritize are milk, poultry and pork.  
The milk sector involves a large number of small producers and will be discussed in 
Chapter II.  In contrast, the latter two sectors are dominated by factory production 
and / or large producers.  Despite the emphasis on production chains, however, this 
concept is apparently underdeveloped. Several informants assert that Minag officials 
have not yet received sufficient training in the methodology behind the production 
chain approach, and that it has not yet proved as successful as they had hoped it 
would be (Int. 6). 
Finally, it is important to note that decentralization will have a significant impact 
within Minag.  Detailed plans have been drafted regarding the transfer of particular 
programs and functions to the regional governments.  Although some transfers have 
taken place, overall, the process appears to be stalled in its early stages (Int. 10).  
The delays are partly due to concern within Minag that regional governments do not 
have the capacity and expertise necessary to handle their new responsibilities.  These 
are concerns that are common across Ministries and are shared by numerous 
observers.  Other informants assert that the slow progress of transfers is due to vested 
interests within the central bureaucracy (Int. 15, Int. 3). 
Factors limiting Minag’s capacity to promote pro-poor development.  Minag is the  
main state actor in the livestock sector, and it is of critical importance for the Pro 
Poor Livestock Policy Initiative.  However, a great number of structural problems 
impede Minag’s ability to focus on the needs of small producers, and, more broadly, 
its overall institutional capacity to promote the development of the livestock sector. 
Two factors limit Minag’s attention to the interests of small producers in the Andean 
regions: the importance of coastal agricultural producers and Minag’s institutional 
centralization within the capital of Lima.  Minag focuses primarily on the needs of the 
dynamic agro-export sector, which is made up of fruit and vegetable producers, 
among them mango, avocado, and asparagus.  These producers are both economically 
important and politically influential.  Small producers in the sierra, in contrast, are 
poor and badly organized, and hence politically and socially marginalized.  The fact 
that policy design occurs primarily in the central offices of Minag, without 
                                                 
5Some Minag functionaries maintained that this decree explicitly prohibits Minag agencies from engaging in the direct 
provision of services to producers (Int. 13, Int 24).  The author, however, did not find any clause in the text of Decree 017 
prohibiting Minag entities from service provision. Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
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participation from regional producers further contributes to the ministry’s lack of 
attention to small producers (Int. 10).
6  
Minag’s budget gives a rough illustration of its bias against small producers.  Conacs, 
the institution whose operations directly affect some of the poorest of Peru’s small 
producers, the alpaca herders, received only 1% of Minag’s resources in 2003.  In 
contrast, Senasa, whose projects are focused primarily (though not entirely) on the 
needs of the agro-export sector, received 11% of the total budget that year (Minag 
2003a: 101).     
Turning to Minag’s overall institutional capacity, the first impediment is the agency’s 
unwieldy structure, which can be readily appreciated upon a glance at Figure 1.   
According to  one key informant, Minag’s structure is gigantic, costly, and fragmented 
(Int. 10).  Coordination between offices and among sub-agencies is insufficient.   
According to the same informant, each sub-entity can be considered an island, 
operating its own projects in isolation from the others.  Consequently, there is 
significant fragmentation and duplication of efforts among the sub-entities, leading to 
inefficiency and hindering attainment of goals.  For example, in practice, three 
separate offices are engaged in general policy formulation.  These include one 
consultative department [Organo de Asesoramiento]: the Oficina General de 
Planificación Agraria, and two line-agencies [Organos de Linea]: the Dirección General 
de Promoción Agraria, and the Dirección General de Información Agraria (Int. 10). 
 
The existence of numerous power groups within Minag further hinders possibilities for 
more effective coordination within the ministry (Int. 10).   
Similar problems exist at the regional level.  There is significant overlap of functions 
and lack of coordination between the DRAs and the regional OPD offices, as well as 
among the different OPD offices.  For example, Conacs officials in the Puno office 
assert that Senasa executed its1998 camelid vaccination campaign in the region with 
very little input from or interaction with the former organization, despite its expertise 
on the camelid sector.
7  Consequently, Conacs-Puno officials are critical of this 
vaccination effort, asserting that it was ill-designed and ineffective.    
Compounding Minag’s organizational and coordination problems is the tendency of 
donor agencies and multilateral organizations to establish autonomous offices within 
Minag to manage the projects they fund.  This tendency arises from a reasonable 
desire to ensure effective and proper oversight of funding.  However, it creates the 
possibility of further fragmentation and duplication of efforts.  This practice often 
creates tensions within Minag, since functionaries employed by these donor project 
offices often receive or are perceived as receiving better remuneration than staff in 
the rest of the bureaucracy (Int. 10, Int. 14).  Further, these donor projects may 
siphon off the most talented of Minag’s functionaries, leaving the Ministry’s 
permanent offices with low-quality human resources (Int. 10).  Finally, these projects 
are funded for finite time-periods, and when they end, the experience acquired may 
be lost to Minag (Int. 10). 
Examples of these donor projects include Incargro, an institution that funds technical 
innovation projects with funding from the World Bank, ProAlpaca, a special project 
within Conacs funded by the EU, and Pronamachs, another special project with World 
Bank funds.  Since Incagro competes to a certain degree with Iniea, the OPD that 
conducts research and technical extension, several informants assert that the former 
should have been incorporated into the structure of the latter (Int. 9, Int. 10).   
ProAlpaca, as its staff and funders assert, is technically subordinate to Conacs; 
however, outside observers maintain that in practice, it is relatively autonomous.   
                                                 
6Proponents of decentralization hope that it will help redress this latter problem.  However, as noted above, this process has 
stalled, and regional governments are unprepared to successfully manage the programs and functions that will be transferred 
to them. 
7See the discussion on Senasa below for more information about the camelid vaccination campaign. Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
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A second impediment that hinders Minag’s efficacy is the tremendous instability of its 
leadership.  Indeed, Minag is perhaps the least stable of all government ministries.  
During the first four years of Toledo’s presidential term, the Minister of Agriculture 
has changed five times.  One observer explained that when political conflicts arise 
within the government, this position is frequently used as a bargaining chip to mollify 
discontented sectors (Int. 10).  As a result of these dynamics, individuals appointed as 
Minister of Agriculture frequently lack relevant expertise. Opinions among informants 
varied regarding the extent to which rotation of functionaries occurs within Minag.  
Several informants suggested that the instability is mostly confined to the top 
leadership levels within Minag, and that technical teams are not as vulnerable (Int. 
10, Int. 6).  Others assert that in at least some of Minag’s subdivisions, such as Conacs, 
much more extensive turnover of functionaries and technical teams has occurred (Int. 
14).  In general, however, a change in the minister always opens the possibility for 
disruptive shifts in policy emphasis as well as personnel changes, with the 
concomitant threat of loss of expertise and experience (Int. 1).
8   
Third, Minag has relatively little influence within the state.  For example, Minag has 
particularly low rapport with the powerful Ministry of Economics and Finances, which 
controls assignment of financial resources and tax policy, which has a significant 
impact on the agricultural sector.
9  Nor does Minag have much influence with the 
Congress, where agricultural legislation is passed.  Deputies who sit on the agriculture 
commission have their own agricultural advisors and generally do not consult Minag 
officials (Int. 10).  Partly as a result of this lack of communication, Minag occasionally 
receives legislation from Congress that it cannot implement due to design flaws or 
contradictions with existing norms and decrees (Int. 10). 
With the above issues in mind, the following sections introduce and discuss the Minag 
entities of greatest relevance to the livestock sector.  These are the Dirección 
Nacional de Crianzas and three OPAs: Conacs, which deals exclusively with camelids; 
Senasa, the animal and plant sanitation agency; and Iniea, a research and 
technological extension institute.
 10 
Dirección Nacional de Crianzas (DNC) 
The  Dirección Nacional de Crianzas is a line-agency of the Dirección General de 
Promoción Agraria within Minag that deals with issues related to livestock.  Among the 
DNC’s functions sanctioned in Decree 017 are establishing a network of contacts 
among Minag entities, regional governments, and other public institutions that provide 
services to livestock producers, proposing and organizing training activities for the 
functionaries in charge of coordinating production chains in the Direcciones Regionales 
Agrarias, and supervising and evaluating the provision of specialized services to 
organized livestock producers in prioritized production chains (El Peruano 201537).   
The DNC has been working actively with Condesan on matters of relevance to the Pro-
Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (Int. 26).  Its director asserts that Minag must help to 
strengthen producers associations (Int. 24).  Experts assert that the DNC has well 
qualified staff and technical teams (Int. 1).  
However, the DNC’s efficacy appears to be restricted by its limited influence within 
Minag; the Oficina General de Planificación Agraria (OGPA) has proven somewhat 
reluctant to take into account the DNC’s policy suggestions.  Nolte (2003: 58) makes 
                                                 
8Of course, change in leadership can also be positive; new ministers have occasionally removed ineffective or unprofessional 
project or OPD heads. 
9The subject of taxation will not be discussed in this report because of its complexity, and the fact that it is generally of 
lesser relevance for poor producers in the sierra. 
10The special project Marenass (Proyecto Manejo de Recursos Naturales en la Sierra Sur), has also executed initiatives 
relevant to the livestock sector, but it will not be discussed in this report. For more information, see Minag (2003:40-42) and 
Nolte (2003: 52, 66).   Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
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reference to problems with the DNC’s status within Minag as well and offers the 
following recommendation: “To improve its capacity for action, the elevation of the 
DNC to the Dirección General should be considered, in order to improve access to the 
Despacho Ministerial [the highest level office of Minag], and to guarantee it access to 
the financial resources needed to maintain an effective and experienced team.”
11  
Consejo Nacional de Camélidos Sudamericanos (Conacs) 
Conacs was created in the early 1990s with the primary mandate of protecting Peru’s 
vicuñas, an endangered species of wild camelid with highly valued fiber.  In addition 
to vicuña management and protection programs, Conacs now operates numerous 
initiatives designed to promote the alpaca sector; these domestic camelids are raised 
for both their fiber and their meat.  These initiatives, as well as Conacs’ institutional 
evolution, will be discussed extensively in Chapter IV in the context of the actors and 
politics of the alpaca sector.  Finally, as noted above, Conacs houses the EU’s special 
project Proalpaca, which operates exclusively in the regions of Apurimac, 
Huancavelica, and Ayacucho.  This project was established in 2004 and is funded by 
EU PASA Peru (Programa de Apoyo a la Seguiridad Alimentaria) through 2007.  As 
noted above, Proalpaca functions in practice much like an independent office.  Conacs 
is a critical institution from the point of view of the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy 
Initiative, given that its mandate entails improving the livelihoods of some of Peru’s 
poorest rural families, the alpaca herders, or alpaqueros. 
Although the bulk of this report’s discussion of Conacs is delayed until Chapter IV, two 
relevant observations on the relationship between Minag and Conacs will be made 
here.  First, Conacs is marginal within the ministry in terms of its budget.  In 2003, for 
example, Conacs’ funds amounted to only 1% of Minag’s total budget (Minag 2003a).  
Further, the EU funds destined exclusively to Proalpaca for its operations in the three 
designated regions presently make up the vast majority of Conacs’ total resources 
(Int. 14, Int. 13).   Conacs’ 1% of Minag’s budget made it the least endowed of the 
OPAs in 2003.  
Second, Conacs appears to be fairly autonomous in terms of its general status within 
Minag, partly since it is the only entity that handles issues related to camelids.  As 
such, Conacs may have greater leeway in formulating policies than the Dirección de 
Crianzas.  However, Conacs’ operations are occasionally slowed down by the need to 
work with the directive bodies of Minag.  For example, Conacs’ National Strategy for 
the Development of Domestic Camelids (Estrategia Nacional del Desarrollo de los 
Camelidos Domesticos), completed in 2004, was still awaiting approval by the OGPA at 
the time of this writing.  In addition, Conacs cannot directly interact with other 
Ministries, but must instead solicit or channel its communications through the Minag 
directorate, a bureaucratic requirement that may also introduce delays.
12 
Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agraria (Senasa) 
In contrast to the central offices of Minag and most other Peruvian state agencies, 
Senasa is considered a highly professional public institution that has been successfully 
protected from political interference.  Although Senasa is responsible to Minag, it is 
administratively and financially autonomous; staff members are hired based on merit.  
                                                 
11 “Para una mejor capacidad de acción, conviene plantear la elevación de la [Dirección Nacional de Crianzas] a la de 
D i r e c c i ó n  G e n e r a l ,  d e  m o d o  d e  a c o r t a r  e l  a c c e s o   a l  D e s p a c h o  M i n i s t e r i a l ,  a  l a  v e z  q u e  p a r a  c o n t a r  c o n  l o s  r e c u r s o s  
financieros para la  constitución de un equipo solvente y debidamente experimentado.” 
12For example, Conacs requires information from the Ministry of Economics and Finances regarding a proposal to exempt 
dried alpaca meat from taxation—a measure that would benefit small producers (see Chapter IV)—but significant time has 
passed since Conacs submitted its request through Minag.  Much of the delay likely originates with the MEF.  However, there 
may well be a need for Minag to take more rapid action on matters of importance to Conacs.  Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
11 
Since its formation in 1992, Senasa has had only three directors; the present director, 
who is considered an excellent tecnico, was named in 1995.  Technical teams have 
also remained remarkably stable over the last eight years.  This degree of continuity is 
truly impressive in the Peruvian context, particularly considering the high rate of 
turnover within Minag.   
Senasa’s unique status may be due partly to support from the IDB, which initiated a 
five-year institutional strengthening program with Senasa in 1998.  The IDB has 
promoted continuity within Senasa, expressing its preferences to the government in 
this regard when appropriate.  Although there have been attempts by politicians to 
insert supporters within Senasa over the years, they have never been successful (Int. 
44).  Perhaps more importantly, private actors work to defend Senasa as well.  The 
coastal agro-export sector has a strong interest in a capable and professional Senasa, 
and it has the political influence to defend this interest (Int. 44, Int. 46) 
While Senasa’s isolation from political interference clearly enhances its potential to 
successfully promote animal health, the agency is more active around agricultural 
sanitation issues.  This focus again reflects the interests of the economically and 
politically strong coastal agro-exporters.  Fruit fly eradication, for example, has been 
Senasa’s best funded program over the last five years (IDB report).  Senasa’s animal 
health initiatives, which include foot and mouth disease eradication and programs to 
control brucellosis (brucelosis) in goats and cows, tuberculosis in cows, and scabies 
(sarna, an external parasite) in camelids and sheep, have been less amply funded.  
Many of these programs, which received funding from the IDB in the late 1990s, are 
considered to have achieved their goals and will not receive significant additional 
investment, whereas maladies afflicting the coastal agro-exports will continue to be 
prioritized.  With this information in mind, Senasa’s FMD and scabies programs will be 
briefly discussed below, given their relevance for this study.  
Foot and Mouth Disease Program: One of Senasa’s major initiatives in recent years has 
been control and eradication of foot and mouth disease (FMD), which received 
financial support from the IDB.  In early 2005, the southern region of Peru was 
approved by the OIE (International Organization of Epizootics) as free of FMD without 
vaccination; the official certificate was expected to arrive in April.  In addition, the 
northern zone of the country is reportedly FMD-free under vaccination.  Senasa and 
IDB officials have great confidence in their disease monitoring and control system.  
Senasa operates control points at strategic locations to monitor animal movement 
across the borders of the FMD free zone, and it maintains a disease reporting and 
tracing system.  Functionaries assert that this system allowed for the rapid control of 
an FMD outbreak in Lima early this decade (Int. 17, Int. 44); Senasa determined that 
the disease-carrying animal had entered Peru illegally from Ecuador.  
Despite the fact that FMD control operations in Peru probably do work far better than 
i n  B o l i v i a ,  a s  a n  I D B  o f f i c i a l  w i t h  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  a s s e r t e d  ( I n t .  4 4 ,  
Fairfield 2004), Senasa’s capacity to maintain the disease free-zone is probably not as 
robust as reported.  One limiting factor is the fact that Senasa itself does not have the 
authority to stop or detain individuals at the checkpoints; it must coordinate with law 
enforcement agencies to control animal movement.  When pressed, Senasa officials 
admit that animals without transit certificates do occasionally get through control 
posts (Int. 17).  These informants note that Senasa has held workshops with the police 
forces to explain procedures for and the importance of controlling animal movement 
(Int. 17).   
Since there is little future for the export of Peruvian meets other than chicken and 
pork, and because small producers at any rate would not be able to participate 
directly in such ventures due to the difficulty of meeting sanitary requirements, 
Senasa’s FMD program is not of great relevance to small producers.  Peru’s neighbors 
produce most meats at far lower costs, and greater volumes of cheap imported meat 
will likely enter Peru as it becomes more integrated with Mercosur.  Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
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Scabies Program:  Of much greater potential relevance to small producers is Senasa’s 
camelid vaccination program.  In 1998, Senasa received funding from the IDB that 
included resources for an anti-scabies project that had been designed several years 
before.  This external parasite afflicted about 30% of alpacas in the country and 
inflicted significant economic damage through its negative impact on fiber production 
(Int. 17).  Senasa’s program was composed of two components: working closely with 
specially selected producers on establishing good management practices on 1,500 
demonstration units (unidades demostrativas) and providing workshops and education 
for interested producers who were not selected to form demonstration units.  Senasa 
hoped that best management practices established on the selected units would spread 
among the alpaquero population at large by demonstration effect.  Through this 
design, Senasa hoped to achieve sustainable results and avoid dependency 
(asistentialismo) (Int. 46).   
In practice, this project design led Senasa to work primarily with relatively large 
producers (Int. 37).  Requirements for selecting producers or groups of 3 or 4 family 
members to form demonstration units included ownership of 200 or more animals and 
the ability to finance part of the costs of the anti-scabies products to be used (Int. 
46).
13  Although Senasa and the IDB view the program as a success in that it achieved 
its targeted objectives, critics note that the initiative did not in practice reach the 
very poor families that constitute the majority of alpaqueros (Int. 37). 
While it is interesting that Senasa did allocate resources to the scabies campaign, 
given the beneficiaries’ lack of political influence, the following illustrates the limits 
of Senasa’s attention to the alpaqueros.  After funds had been assigned to the scabies 
project, the cost of the medicines fell significantly.  Instead of expanding the scope of 
the project accordingly, the extra funds were instead reallocated to the fruit fly 
control program (Int. 44).  Of the $4.5 million originally earmarked to the scabies 
campaign, $1.5 million was transferred to the fruit fly program.  A comparison of 
resources allocated for the two projects is also informative.  The scabies campaign 
ultimately received $3.9 million in joint IDB and Peruvian government funds, whereas 
the fruit fly program over the same time period received $27.3 million (IDB report). 
Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Extensión Agraria (Iniea)   
Iniea is a research and extension institute that has programs related to both 
agriculture and livestock.  Livestock projects relevant to small producers include 
research programs on guinea pig (cuyes), sheep, and camelids.  Of these, the cuy 
program has the longest and most developed trajectory. 
Cuyes are native to the high Andes and have long been an important source of 
supplemental protein for poor families.  They are traditionally kept in the kitchen and 
fed household food byproducts; women and children are responsible for their care.  
Cuy has also become a popular restaurant item in the sierra as well as in Lima, where 
it commands significant prices on the market (about $3 per animal) due to high 
demand (Int. 27, Int. 30).  Families have thus been able to benefit from selling their 
surplus cuyes on the internal market.  There are also export opportunities for cuyes, 
but these will likely be taken advantage of primarily by large producers with the 
capital to operate modern, intensive factory farms (granjas).
14  Families and small 
                                                 
13Within the set of eligible producers, however, Senasa reportedly tried to work with the less well-off (Int. 46).  It may also 
be possible that some of the groups included in the unidades demostrativas initiate were composed of poorer families who 
were able to combine their animals to achieve the 200 animal cut-off, although given that the average family owns only 80 
animals, this scenario seems somewhat improbable.     
14There is interest in cuyes within the Ministry of Production due to the export potential for this product. Several large 
producers are currently exporting cuyes to Ecuadorian and Peruvian communities in the US.  Businessmen from several elite 
families are reportedly showing great interest in large-scale cuy operations.   Chapter I: The State and the Livestock Sector 
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producers may, however, be able to sell cuyes to exporters seeking to increase their 
volumes (Int. 30).    
Iniea’s cuy program was initiated in the 1960s.  Under the direction of Lilia Chauca, 
Iniea has developed through genetic selection numerous improved breeds of guinea 
pigs, characterized by their prolific reproduction, fast growth rates, and larger sizes.  
Balanced feeds and more careful management practices than traditionally employed 
are required to raise these animals.
15   
In addition to genetic selection and management system research, Iniea has engaged 
in initiatives to distribute improved animals among small producers throughout the 
sierra regions.  These have included rotating funds, in which families receive a pair of 
reproducers and then contribute some number of young cuyes back to the fund.  Such 
programs had a particularly important impact in Cajamarca (Int. 27).  Iniea has also 
provided some training and technical extension from its regional centers in the sierra.  
The greatest achievements of these programs have been helping to improve nutrition 
among poor families and raising the self-esteem and economic position of the women 
who care for cuyes (Int. 27).  
Despite its accomplishments, Iniea’s research has not been well disseminated (Int. 
26), likely due to its funding limitations.  Iniea’s funds have occasionally been 
supplemented by support from international organizations; for example, Canada’s 
International Development Research Center (IDRC) funded a research project to 
evaluate Iniea’s cuy extension programs, and Spain is currently providing financial 
resources for an urban cuy raising program in Lima (Int. 27). 
 
                                                 
15Extensive information on cuyes and management systems are available in Produccion de Cuyes by Chauca (1997).   
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CHAPTER II: NATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT 
This chapter discusses political actors and political processes in Peru.  As such, it 
provides background which is essential for understanding the political economy of the 
livestock sector and evaluating prospects for pro-poor development.  Section 1 
provides a discussion of party system collapse, the most salient feature of Peruvian 
politics since the early 1990s, and comments on the capacity of parties to advance a 
pro-poor development agenda.  Section 2 presents an overview of national-level civil 
society actors relevant to the livestock sector.  In general, there are few organized 
actors with the ability to promote the interests of small producers at the national 
level.  Peru’s highly volatile, un-institutionalized political parties are poor vehicles for 
representation of any popular interests.  Moreover, civil society in Peru is quite weak, 
although there are several organizations of interest to this project that are active at 
the national level.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of decentralization in 
Section 3.  This process may hold the promise of promoting greater participation and 
accountability in politics if numerous problems in design and execution could be 
resolved. 
Section 1: A Collapsed Party System 
Peru provides the paradigmatic example of party system collapse.  This phenomenon, 
which political scientists generally view as deleterious to democracy, has occurred in 
several Latin American countries over the past two decades and has stimulated much 
research.
16  In 1990, Alberto Fujimori, a virtually unknown political outsider, won the 
presidency in Peru amidst a crisis characterized by deep economic recession, 
hyperinflation, and continuing terrorist attacks by the radical guerrilla movement 
Sendero Luminoso.  By the end of his two presidential terms, Peru’s traditional parties 
had all but disappeared.  In their place have emerged numerous loosely organized, 
personalistic and ephemeral political groupings that many argue cannot accurately be 
termed parties.   
Peru’s established parties had remained relatively strong until the late 1980s.   
However, tremendous polarization occurred as the 1990 election approached, in the 
context of severe economic crisis and guerrilla violence.  This polarization left the 
political center available for Fujimori to occupy.  On the left, the Izquierda Unida  
(United Left) coalition and a number of small parties advocated a democratic route to 
socialism, while on the right, the formerly centrist Partido Acción Popular (AP) and 
the conservative Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC) allied behind presidential candidate 
Vargas Llosa’s neoliberal economic platform.  Meanwhile, APRA, the governing 
populist party, was plagued by internal power struggles and the ignominious legacy of 
outgoing president Alan Garcia (Tanaka 2002a).  His heterodox and inconsistent 
policies had helped to create the economic crisis; he later entered exile to avoid 
corruption charges.  Fujimori’s personalistic campaign, his image as a man of the 
people untarnished by torrid partisan politics, and his promises to avoid harsh 
economic stabilization measures won the support of the atomized lower classes 
(Roberts 1995, Weyland 2002).  Votes from apristas and members of the left helped 
Fujimori win the second round of the presidential election (Tanaka 2002a).  
                                                 
16See for example Jason Seawright, forthcoming, “The ‘Demand Side’ of Party System Collapse: Political Preferences and 
Votes for Insurgent Parties;” and Kenneth Roberts, 2002, “Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America’s 
Neoliberal Era,” Studies in Comparative International Development 36 (4): 3-33.  For more on Peru, see Levitsky and 
Cameron 2003, and for the case of Venezuela, Michael Coppedge, “Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela through 
Nested Induction,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Sept. 
2-5 2001.   Chapter II: National Political Context 
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Fujimori proceeded to launch a concerted attack against both the political class and 
established democratic institutions, an agenda that proved quite popular with the 
citizenry and helped to distract attention away from the harsh neoliberal shock he 
implemented immediately after taking power (campaign promises notwithstanding) 
(Roberts 1995).  In 1992, Fujimori closed Congress, purged the judiciary, and 
suspended the constitution.  In the aftermath of this “self-coup,” Fujimori convened a 
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, which was approved in the 1993 
national referendum.   
These popularly condoned authoritarian initiatives, together with the ultimate success 
of the economic stabilization measures and the defeat of Sendero Luminoso through 
the opportune capture of its leader, consolidated Fujimori’s power and sealed the 
demise of the traditional political parties.
17  Fujimori swept the 1995 elections with 
64.4% of the vote (Tanaka 2002a).  His political movement, Cambio 90- Nueva 
Mayoria, won a majority in Congress with 67 seats.  The traditional political parties, 
which had together obtained more than 90% of the vote in the 1985 presidential 
elections, now achieved minimal representation (Tanaka 1998: 55).
18  APRA did best, 
winning only 8 seats.
19 
In the aftermath of Fujimori’s attack on the political establishment, organized 
political parties have been largely replaced by so-called “taxi” or “disposable” parties, which 
form to support a particular candidate’s bid for power (Freidenberg 2002, Levitsky and 
Cameron 2003).  These highly personalistic parties have little if any organizational 
structure and are held together by the appeal of the leader they support.  Taxi parties 
are thus usually short-lived and tend to disintegrate in the aftermath of elections, in 
contrast to more traditional parties, which carry out various activities with their 
membership on a regular basis (Tanaka 2002b).  Accordingly, the list of parties with 
representatives in the Peruvian congress has changed dramatically from election to 
election in recent years.  
Prominent examples of taxi parties include Fujimori’s various party vehicles and 
sitting president Toledo’s Perú Posible.  Fujimori’s first party, Cambio 90, developed 
no permanent infrastructure or membership and established no internal statutes.   
Fujimori created a second personalistic party for the 1992 constituent assembly, a 
third for the 1998 municipal elections, and a fourth for his second reelection 
campaign in 2000.  After his scandalous demise in 2000, precipitated by the public 
airing of tapes showing his top political advisor bribing congressmen and justices, 
Fujimori’s residual party, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria, nearly disappeared from the 
political arena.  It won only 5% of the vote in the 2001 legislative elections.
20  Toledo’s 
Perú Posible in contrast did establish a party directorate and a few statutes, but its 
internal organization and coherence were always weak (Tanaka 2002b).  Riding on 
Toledo’s popularity in the 2001 presidential election, Perú Posible won 26% of the 
vote in the legislative elections.  However, the party has fragmented in the wake of 
Toledo’s rapidly declining popularity.  Disagreements between the president, his 
cabinet members, and party representatives in congress became increasingly 
pronounced during the early years of Toledo’s tenure (Tanaka 2002b).  
  
APRA, the populist party established in 1930, is the only traditional party that has 
survived the Fujimori years to some degree.  APRA maintains a central party 
                                                 
17Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 2) analyze the collapse of Peru’s party system as follows: “ …the full-scale decomposition of 
the party system…was ultimately the product of Fujimori’s political success in the wake of the 1992 autogolpe [self-coup]. 
Peruvian politicians drew two lessons from this success: (1) that public opinion would not reward the defense of formal 
democratic institutions and (2) that parties were not necessary for (and may impede) career advancement.  In light of these 
lessons, scores of politicians abandoned both established parties and the democratic opposition in favor of an “independent” 
strategy centered on individualized and short-term electoral goals.” 
18Acción Popular, the PPC, and Izquierda Unida gained only 4, 3 and 2 seats respectively.    
19 (Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University:  www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Peru/leg95.html ) 
20 Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University.www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Peru/leg2001.html  Chapter II: National Political Context 
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bureaucracy and is more institutionalized than the other political groups.
21  Like the 
new parties, however, its political prospects are closely tied to the popularity of its 
personalistic leader.  Garcia enjoyed an unexpected comeback as APRA’s presidential 
candidate in the 2001 election after his return from exile, and the party accordingly 
won 20% of the vote in the legislative elections.  Since then, Garcia has been working 
to rebuild the party.  However, in his absence, it appears that APRA can count on 
popular support amounting to only around 3% of the vote.   
Political scientists tend to agree that party system collapse and a predominance of 
weak, volatile, and personalistic parties is unhealthy for democracy.  Indeed, it is 
commonly argued that strong, institutionalized parties are a key ingredient for 
effective democracy.
22  Ideally, such parties form links between state and society by 
providing representation for voter’s interests and encouraging participation in politics.  
Left parties can play an especially important role in stabilizing democracy by 
articulating and seeking to advance the interests of marginalized groups through the 
democratic system (Bruhn 1997).  Strong, institutionalized parties with well-defined 
platforms can help guard against the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the 
excessive personalism and caudillismo which have been so common in Latin America 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  Strong parties may also help ensure accountability to 
the electorate by requiring their leaders to respect party platforms that have been 
sanctioned by the voters.
23  Further, Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 3) note that strong 
parties are critical for governability: “By serving as a bridge between executives and 
legislatures, parties provide a critical mechanism for overcoming gridlock. Without the 
disciplining function of parties, legislatures may degenerate into chaos or, worse, a 
marketplace for peddling influence.”
24  
Most important from the point of view of this project is the role that strong, 
institutionalized parties play in representing voter’s interests and serving as a channel 
for participation in politics.  In the case of Peru, parties lack strong ties to any clearly 
defined electorate or organized interests within civil society.  Indeed, over the 1990s, 
Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 10) assert that “parties were reduced to narrow circles 
of elites.”  As such, they cannot serve as effective organizations for representing the 
interests of popular sectors, beyond advocating generally desirable goals such as 
containing inflation and creating jobs.  Peru, like many other Latin American 
countries, is consequently experiencing a “crisis of representation.”  Symptoms of this 
affliction include declining citizen confidence in politicians and political parties and a 
related deterioration of support for democratic institutions. 
In addition, the weakness of political parties in Peru contributes to instability within 
public agencies that limits state capacity to promote development.  No political party 
in Peru has enough members to field all of the candidate lists for national elections 
from within its own ranks.  Instead, parties secure the candidates they need by 
making bargains with independent politicians.  For example, would-be candidates are 
often in need of a party banner under which to run, and smaller political groups may 
be amenable to joining forces with a larger group.  As a consequence of these 
dynamics, parties incur numerous political obligations that must be fulfilled after 
                                                 
21 In the 1990s during Garcia’s exile, there were no APRA party offices to be found in Lima; the eight legislative 
representatives kept the party afloat working out of their congressional offices (Freidenberg 2002). 
22 For an overview of arguments asserting that strong parties are in fact detrimental to democracy, see Stokes 2001.  Some of 
these arguments originate from scholars of the Venezuelan system, where the two parties, feeding on state resources, 
become overly entrenched and failed to provide adequate representation.  Others were expressed by political philosophers 
wary of parties and the influence of special interests. 
23 Stokes (2001), however, argues that evidence from Latin America suggests that both weak parties in volatile systems and 
strong parties in stable systems have ignored voter mandates by implementing dramatic policy switches. 
24Indeed, Peru’s congressional deputies regularly switched their party affiliations in the Fujimori years.  They demonstrated 
little loyalty to the political coalitions that secured their election and proved extremely vulnerable to bribery by Fujimori’s 
advisor Montesinos. Chapter II: National Political Context 
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elections.  New presidents are therefore under tremendous pressure to award jobs in 
public agencies to members of their political coalitions and their supporters (Int. 29).    
These problems will not be resolved in the near future; strong parties with deep roots 
in society are unlikely to reemerge in Peru.  As Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 20) 
argue, politicians lack the incentives and capacity to rebuild party organizations.   
Neoliberalism has brought about extensive social atomization and heterogeneity of 
economic interests that make it difficult to organize constituencies.  Meanwhile, a 
shift to mass-media oriented campaigns that easily reach atomized voters has reduced 
politicians’ need for traditional party organizations that were once critical for building 
political support (Tanaka 1998).
25   
Given the considerations discussed above, Peru’s parties have little capacity at 
present to effectively represent the interests of small rural producers.  The various 
taxi parties and volatile national political alliances by their very nature are ineffective 
organizations for representing the interests of the rural poor or other popular sectors.  
First, these parties tend to be controlled by small political groups in Lima (Int. 29) 
that have little knowledge of or interest in rural issues.  Second, their instability and 
their inability to win majorities in Congress make them ineffective at pursuing any 
concrete agenda.  APRA, the only party with any real organization on the ground 
level, has historically attracted support from the middle class and popular sectors, but 
it cannot be said to champion the interests of the rural poor at the national level.  
The policies it has advocated, in fact, have spanned the political spectrum from left 
to right (McNulty, forthcoming).
26  Leftist parties, in contrast, have maintained much 
closer links with organized sectors of labor and the peasantry.  For example, the 
Confederación Campesino de Peru and labor unions supported the parties of the left-
wing Izquierda Unida coalition throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Crabtree 2002: 151).  
The various left parties are still active today among these bases; however, they are 
electorally irrelevant (Int. 29).
27  
                                                 
25See also Kenneth M. Roberts, 2002. “Party-Society Linkages and the Transformation of Political Representation in Latin 
America,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 27, no. 53: 9-34 and Taylor C. Boas, 2005. "Television 
and Neopopulism in Latin America: Media Effects in Brazil and Peru." Latin American Research Review 40, no. 2: 27-49.   
26However, decentralization is introducing new dynamics within the party that could help make it more 
responsive to its base.  Since APRA’s regional presidents are accountable to their regional constituencies, not 
to the central party leaders in Lima, control from the center may be eroding (Int. 15).  As decentralization 
becomes better institutionalized, APRA might pay more attention to issues important to the rural poor. In 
Cajamarca, for example, the APRA regional government has tended to support popular mobilizations against 
the Yanacocha mine (Int. 31). That possibility is of course conditional on small producers becoming better 
organized and more effective at voicing their interests.  APRA is strong in the northern coastal and sierra 
regions. It won the largest number of regional presidents (twelve out of 25) of all the parties in 2002, including 
Cajamarca, Ancash, and Ayacucho.  However, the party has little presence in Puno, where many of Peru’s 
poorest rural producers live. 
27Although parties do not have stable, institutionalized links to rural voters, politicians may still rely on rural 
votes to be elected, and they may attempt to appeal to this sector through means other than well-defined 
political platforms that promote particular interests.  Most notably, Fujimori was able to build critical support 
outside of Lima through his targeted social spending programs (see Section 2), which channeled funds to small, 
poor municipalities throughout the sierra and rural Peru.  The efficacy of this tactic was enhanced by political 
manipulation; the majority of funds were directed to those provinces in which the “marginal political impact of 
expenditures was likely to be largest,” that is, poor regions where previous support for Fujimori had been fairly 
low (Schady 1999: 2).  The support base that Fujimori thus created in Peru’s poorest departments helped him 
to win reelection in 1995 and 2000 (Roberts and Arce 1998).  Despite the massive corruption scandal that led to 
his flight from Peru in 2000, Fujimori remains quite popular in many regions, including Puno, as a legacy of these 
programs.  This illustration aside, several informants emphasized that Lima is by far the most important focus for national 
electoral campaigns because of its tremendous population density: about 30% of Peru’s population lives in Lima (McDevitt 
1999).  That reality of course acts to limit national politicians’ interest in the countryside.   Chapter II: National Political Context 
18 
Section 2: National-Level Civil Society Actors Relevant to the 
Livestock Sector 
In Crabtree’s (2002: 151) analysis, “the progressive weakening of the rural ‘lobby’ has 
been one of the salient features of rural politics over the last 30 years” in Peru, a 
state of affairs that does not bode well for pro-poor development in the livestock 
sector.  While a number of important rural organizations developed in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1969 agrarian reform, developments in the 1980s and 1990s acted to 
greatly weaken their influence.  Consequently, there are no strong national 
associations representing small producers today in Peru.  The dramatic changes 
initiated in the countryside by agrarian reform stimulated organization in the rural 
sector in the 1970s.  Some associations formed to oppose the reforms, while others 
arose to support them.  Most relevant from the point of view of this study were the 
Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA), created by president Velasco to support his 
policies, and the more independent Confederación Campesino del Peru (CCP), which 
actively pressured the government to accelerate agrarian reform (Crabtree 2002:151).  
In addition, the newly formed cooperatives provided organization in the countryside 
focused on production. 
The end of agrarian reform, economic crisis, and Sendero Luminoso violence in the 
1980s weakened rural organizations and their ability to influence policy.  The 
parcelization of cooperatives, most of which had proved highly unsuccessful 
economically (Hunefeldt 1997), largely eliminated that form of organization.  With 
their members hard hit by hyperinflation and other manifestations of the economic 
crisis, the CNA and the CCP experienced a debilitating decline in their mobilizational 
capacity.  In addition, the leftist parties with which the CCP had close ties began to 
enter into crisis, a development that further limited that association’s influence.   
Meanwhile, guerrilla terrorism undermined rural organizations of all kinds.  The 
deepening economic crisis and the withdrawal of the state from the agricultural sector 
created ideal conditions for the rise of Sendero Luminoso.  This extremely radical and 
violent revolutionary movement arose in highland regions that had been overlooked by 
agrarian reform.   Sendero Luminoso targeted and killed leaders of all types of grass-
roots organizations in the countryside that did not espouse a violent path to social 
change, as well as state functionaries and NGO officials involved in rural development 
initiatives.
28  The impact of Sendero Luminoso was particularly strong in the southern 
sierra regions of Peru.  The havoc Sendero wrecked in the countryside was 
compounded by militarization and widespread violation of human rights by the army.  
As Crabtree (2002: 152) notes, “In such circumstances, it became impossible, or even 
irrelevant, to represent the economic interests of peasants or small-scale producers.”  
Fujimori’s policies in the 1990s further weakened rural lobbying groups and producers’ 
associations.  First, continued parcelization of cooperatives and economic 
liberalization increased heterogeneity in the countryside.  The ensuing dispersion of 
crops and growing economic marginalization of peasants and small producers made it 
more difficult for them to successfully organize (Crabtree 2002: 153).  Second, just as 
state intervention had stimulated organization in the 1970s, accelerated state retreat 
from the countryside created disincentives for organization in the 1990s.  The state 
was no longer interested in negotiating with sectoral associations, and many agencies 
with which associations had interacted had been dramatically retrenched or ceased to 
exist (Crabtree 2002: 153).  Preexisting organizations were too weak by this time to 
effectively protest the policy changes.  Third, Fujimori’s politically motivated and 
                                                 
28See for example McClintock, Cynthia. 1998, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's 
Shining Path. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, and Degregori, Carlos Iván 1989, Que Difícil es Ser Dios: 
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manipulated poverty alleviation programs—Foncodes and to a lesser extent Pronaa—
further undermined independent grass-roots organizations and local institutions.   
The National Fund for Social Compensation and Development (Fondo Nacional de 
Compensación Social y Desarrollo, Foncodes), a community-based, demand-driven, 
targeted poverty alleviation program, was established in 1991.  It began funding 
small-scale rural development, sanitation, health care, education, and infrastructure 
projects in earnest in 1993.  This agency was established within the Ministry of the 
President, and thus fell under Fujimori’s direct control.  Instead of working with local 
governments and existing grassroots organizations, Foncodes bypassed municipal 
governments and encouraged new base-level groups to form for the sole purpose of 
proposing projects (Roberts 1995: 106).  This mode of operation allowed Fujimori to 
build a direct relationship with the rural poor.  Targeted spending boosted his 
popularity in the countryside, helping him win reelection in 1995 and 2000 (Roberts and 
Arce 1998).  However, Foncodes undermined existing grass-roots organizations and 
acted to further atomize an already fragmented and weakened civil society.   
Producers’ Associations. As a consequence of the factors discussed above, there are 
essentially no strong associations that represent the interests of small agriculture and 
livestock producers at the national level in post-Fujimori Peru.  The groups within the 
agricultural sector that have the most political influence are unquestionably the 
dynamic agro-exporters of the coastal zones.  These producers all have their own 
sectoral associations,
29 which are united through membership in the Association of 
Agro-Export Producers’ Unions of Peru (Asociación de Gremios de Productores 
Agroexportadores del Peru, AGAP).  Within the livestock sector, chicken producers 
and pork raisers are the most influential groups; both are economically successful and 
primarily involve large-scale operations.  Two national-level producers’ associations 
that represent sub-sectors with large numbers of small producers do exist, however.  
These are the AGALEP, which represents milk producers, and SPAR, which organizes 
camelid producers.  These two associations have emerged only recently as relevant at 
the national level, although they do hold promise for the future.  Both are discussed in 
greater detail, respectively, in Chapter III and Chapter IV.  Finally, national-level 
peasant organizations have been marginalized.  While the CNA and CCP still exist, 
they are almost irrelevant politically.   
One additional organization is worthy of discussion: the National Convention for 
Peruvian Agriculture (Convención Nacional del Agro Peruano, Conveagro).  This 
umbrella association was created in the 1990s at the initiative of one of Fujimori’s 
ministers of agriculture, Absalon Vasquez, to foster discussion on problems within the 
sector and to build political support for Fujimori (Int. 5).  Conveagro became an 
independent organization in the late 1990s after Vasquez was dismissed.  Conveagro 
members include producers’ associations and NGOs.  Among these are Fongal-Lima—
the most influential of the milk producers associations, SPAR, and both the CNA and 
CCP, as well as the research institute Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales (Cepes) and 
several universities.  Conveagro represents primarily those sectors of agriculture and 
livestock that produce for the domestic market.  The influential agro-export 
associations are not members of Conveagro, nor are the associations of poultry and 
pork producers. 
Conveagro has become increasingly active in r e c e n t  y e a r s  i n  r e sponse to what it 
perceives as a grave crisis in the agriculture and livestock sectors that has developed 
over the past several decades.  In January of 2004, Conveagro managed to elaborate a 
Consensus Platform consisting of a long list of demands, necessarily fairly general in 
nature, that was universally approved by its member organizations, as well as AGAP 
and the independent poultry and pork associations.  In Feb 2004, Conveagro 
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successfully pressured the government to sign the Carta Verde, a reduced list of 
agreements drawn from the Consensus Platform.  Among the twelve basic lines of 
action included are the following: prioritization of agriculture by the state; 
recognition of decentralization as the “fundamental axis” (eje fundamental) of 
agrarian policy, with an emphasis on making agriculture viable and reducing rural to 
urban migration; state support for the organization and consolidation of producers’ 
associations; protecting domestic producers from international price distortions 
originating in agricultural subsidies; and expanding access to credit and the services 
provided by the new Agrobanco (GNP 2004).
30   
In early 2005, Conveagro was heavily involved in opposing those measures of the Free 
Trade Treaty (FTT) under negotiation with the US government that threatened to most 
damage domestic agriculture.  These included tariff reductions that would expose 
domestic producers to increased volumes of cheap imports. 
Informants’ views of Conveagro and its capacity to influence national policy varied.  
Some see it as a highly successful organization that is effectively lobbying government 
policy-makers (Int. 5, Int. 8).  For these observers, Conveagro’s activities represent a 
significant step toward better coordination and organization in the agriculture and 
livestock sectors.  Other informants are much more cautious, or even cynical, in their 
assessments of Conveagro (Int. 9, Int. 10, Int. 25).  One key informant, for example, 
asserted that Conveagro is in fact extremely weak.  He viewed the Carta Verde as 
merely the expression of crisis and asserted that the government has no capacity to 
enact the vague agreements it contains (Int. 10).  Indeed, even Conveagro supporters 
admit that the Toledo administration has shown no interest in agricultural and 
livestock beyond the agro-export sector (Int. 21).  The author of this report tends to 
agree with the latter point of view.  Given the weakness of many of its member 
associations, Conveagro should perhaps be seen as more a symptom of existing 
organizational problems, rather than a cure for them.
31  Nevertheless, the future of 
Conveagro remains to be seen.  
A side note might be made regarding international cooperation agencies, donors, and 
financial institutions that fund and manage development projects in Peru.  While 
these organizations do have political influence, overall, cooperation agencies appear 
to be less powerful than in poorer Latin American countries such as Bolivia, where the 
government depends to a far greater degree on international aid (Int. 3).  The 
international sector is characterized by significant duplication of efforts and lack of 
coordination, both among different international organizations and, as previously 
discussed, between international organizations and state agencies (Int. 10).  
Section 3: Decentralization 
Decentralization in Peru has generated great enthusiasm and high hopes among 
academics, civil society, politicians, and ordinary citizens alike.  In theory, 
decentralization holds the potential to improve governance, increase participation, 
improve accountability, and, ultimately, to bring about a more equitable distribution 
of resources.  From the point of view of the livestock sector, these changes could 
allow small producers to more effectively voice their demands.  As it has been 
implemented in Peru so far, however, decentralization has born disappointing results.  
                                                 
30Most prominent among the demands in the Consensus Platform left out of the Carta Verde were a number of issues related 
to the tax structure for the agricultural sector.  Due to the complexity of tax issues and the fact that these are for the most 
part of secondary importance for small producers, they are not discussed in this report. 
31For example, Conveagro does not seem to be doing much to help strengthen links between its member organizations and 
their respective bases.  One informant notes that it has failed to mobilize its base members to participate in the new 
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I f  i t  i s  t o  l i v e  u p  t o  t h e  h i g h  e x p e c t ations, numerous problems will have to be 
addressed. 
Decentralization in Peru arose in the context of the transition back to democracy after 
the implosion of Fujimori’s semi-authoritarian regime in 2001.  Remarkably, 
decentralization enjoyed widespread support among the electorate, civil society 
organizations, and politicians alike (McNulty 2004).  Both Toledo and Garcia, the top 
two candidates in the 2001 presidential campaign, promised to support 
decentralization reforms.  Soon after his victory, Toledo announced that regional 
elections would be held in November of 2002.  These dynamics compelled congress 
and the executive to move quickly to forge a legal framework for decentralization.   
 The constitutional reform that initiated the decentralization process created a state 
with 25 administrative and political regions based on the geographical boundaries of 
Peru’s preexisting 25 departments.  Each regional government consists of an elected 
president, an elected Regional Council, and a consultative body known as the Regional 
Coordination Council (Consejo de Coordinación Regional, CCR).  Each CCR is made up 
of representatives elected from civil society as well as the region’s provincial mayors.  
The constitutional reform also asserted the need for participation in regional 
budgeting processes.  Guidelines for participatory budgeting (Presupuesto 
Participativo) were established in later laws.  
Increasing citizen participation in government was a prominent, though not 
uncontroversial, goal of decentralization.
32  Many experts assert that the reforms, 
according to the letter of the law, were in fact quite radical in this regard when 
compared to decentralization in other Latin American countries such as Bolivia (Int. 
29).  Numerous participatory spaces, as well as mechanisms for revoking authorities, 
were included in the reforms (Int. 29).  The most important of these participatory 
spaces are the above-mentioned CCRs and the participatory budgets.  The framework 
governing these institutions will be discussed below, followed by an evaluation of 
their performance to date. 
The CCRs are “consultative and coordinating” bodies that meet at least two times per 
year to discuss the region’s annual development plans and its participatory budget.  
Since the CCRs do not have binding authority, their recommendations need not be 
taken into account by elected officials.  By law, civil society representatives can make 
up no more than 40% of a CCR’s members.  At least one third of the civil society 
representatives must come from the production sectors, which includes agriculture.  
In fact, the law explicitly includes agricultural organizations in a list of example 
organizations allowed to participate in the CCRs.  Civil society representatives are 
elected for two-year terms by civil society delegates, who must belong to 
organizations that are legally registered in the region and have formally existed for at 
least three years.  In addition to the CCRs, the decentralization laws establish 
analogous institutions at the local level (Consejos de Coordinación Locales, CCLs).
33  
Participatory budgeting according to law is obligatory. Members of any legally 
registered civil society organization can participate in regional participatory 
budgeting; there are no restrictions on the age of the organization.  Regional Council 
members and CCR members can also participate.  Participatory budgeting at the 
regional level proceeds through a number of stages that include presentation of the 
previous year’s budget by regional functionaries, discussion of investment priorities, 
and finally, drafting of technical proposals for approval by the Ministry of Economics 
and Finances (McNulty 2004: 14).   
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In addition to the CCRs and participatory budgeting, various sectoral consultation and 
coordination forums are being held at the regional level (Int. 15, Int. 19).  Such 
forums have been convened in the education, health, and agricultural sectors (Int. 
15).  In the case of agriculture, coordination forums are convoked by the Dirección 
Regional Agraria (DRA).  Leaders of all the OPD and special project offices in the 
region are obliged to participate; producers and their associations may participate 
upon invitation by the DRA (Int. 19). 
Decentralization thus created three new institutional realms in which small producers 
can in theory voice their demands and advance their interests.  However, in practice, 
numerous obstacles hinder participation and limit the overall effectiveness of these 
institutions.  In McNulty’s (2004: 15) evaluation, “the mechanisms designed to 
strengthen democracy and increase participation at the regional level have, overall, 
met with limited success.”  Among the factors that have led to this disappointing 
outcome are problems with the legal framework, incomplete implementation of the 
laws, lack of resources, and under-representation of traditionally marginalized groups. 
Problems with the legal framework governing the participation spaces are various.   
First, it is not always clear in practice how the new institutions are supposed to work, 
due to a lack of specificity regarding their functions (McNulty 2004).  For example, 
both the CCRs and the participatory budgets were given jurisdiction over similar 
regional budgeting issues.  In practice, the participatory budgets have emerged as the 
most important space for discussing allocation of resources (Int. 15), an outcome that 
is probably due in part to the fact that the CCRs do not have binding authority.   
Second, the legal framework is often extremely complicated and thus difficult to 
properly implement.  This statement is particularly true of the laws that regulate 
participatory budgeting (McNulty 2004).  A third problem is specific to local 
participation spaces.  The participation mechanisms in general were designed with 
urban settings in mind, which makes them ill-adapted for small rural localities in 
various aspects.  One informant asserts that greater flexibility in the laws is needed to 
correct this problem (Int. 31).  These design-related flaws arose in part because the 
entire process of decentralization was extremely rushed, with little time for debate 
and careful revision of legislation (McNulty 2004).  All of these flaws act to undermine 
the effectiveness of the CCRs, CCLs, and participatory budgeting. 
A perhaps more serious problem is the fact that in several cases, the participatory 
institutions have not been fully implemented in the regions.  This is the case in Puno, 
one of the key regions for the FAO initiative.  Here, the regional president has not yet 
held a participatory budget forum, justifying this breach of the law by claiming that 
Puno is too unstable for the process to proceed (see Chapter IV, Section 2).  There 
appears to be insufficient legal recourse to force the regional president to comply 
with the legal obligation to hold annual participatory budgeting.  This instance calls to 
attention the importance of political will of authorities in the effective functioning of 
the participation institutions, a fact that is true of the local spaces as well, where the 
attitude and expectations of mayors can greatly influence the role of the CCLs and 
participatory budgets (Int. 31).   
Lack of resources is a fundamental problem that undermines one of the key purposes 
of the participation spaces: citizen participation in the allocation of resources.  Lack 
of resources most seriously impacts the participatory budgets, at both the regional 
and local levels.  Transfers from the central government to the regions and 
municipalities are quite small overall.  Moreover, of the regional governments’ total 
annual funds, only a small percentage is available for investment, which requires 
participatory budgeting.  Most of the resources are absorbed by operational costs 
(gastos  corrientes), which are not subject to participatory budgeting.  Lack of 
resources undermines the participation institutions in a second way as well: there are 
insufficient funds and resources to give officials the training they need to ensue 
smooth functioning of the CCRs, and especially participatory budgeting.  Regional 
officials by and large do not have the technical expertise necessary to design project Chapter II: National Political Context 
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proposals that will meet with the required approval of the Ministry of Economics and 
Finances, which maintains strict standards for the participatory budgets.  McNulty 
(2004: 18) asserts that to remedy this problem, “A comprehensive, nation-wide 
training program is needed, yet no agency has the resources to undertake it.”  
An additional problem is the fact that the participation spaces suffer from under-
representation of marginalized groups, precisely those sectors of society 
decentralization would ideally empower.  In reality, grass-roots organizations 
representing poor and geographically isolated constituencies are rarely represented on 
the CCRs, for example.  In 2002, not a single organization from 38% of Peru’s 
provinces registered to participate in the CCRs (McNulty 2004: 20). In Puno, only 2 out 
of 13 provinces registered organizations to participate in the CCR.  Cajamarca did 
somewhat better; 6 out of 13 provinces registered organizations.  In general, the 
participation spaces are reproducing the exclusions traditionally present in Peruvian 
society (Int. 15).   
These problems of representation are hardly surprising, given that marginalized groups 
face high barriers to participation, including transportation costs, high opportunity 
costs for time spent in and traveling to meetings, and lack of organizational resources.  
Moreover, ordinary citizens tend to have little information about the decentralization 
process in general, let alone details regarding the steps they need to take in order to 
participate in the CCRs and budgeting processes.  In the case of the CCRs, the 
requirement that an organization must have existed for three years amounts to an 
added barrier to participation in the context of a weak civil society. 
All of the above problems are of course relevant to the case of small livestock 
producers.  A few additional issues regarding participation by this sector should be 
mentioned.  First, although by law, 33% of CCR civil society representatives must 
come from the “production” sectors, in practice, the definition of “production” 
sectors is rather vague and open to interpretation.  As such, this rule does not 
automatically help to boost participation from the agriculture and livestock sectors.  
Second, there is no leadership within the agriculture and livestock sectors mobilizing 
producers to organize and participate in the CCRs and participatory budgets.   
Conveagro, the logical protagonist in this matter, was too occupied in early 2005 with 
opposing the FTT at the national level to pay much attention to decentralization and 
the upcoming elections to the CCRs (Int. 15). 
In the absence of effective participation by grass-roots organizations, experts assert 
that the new participatory institutions are largely occupied by members of a semi-
professional class with experience in politics or public administration.  These 
individuals serve as brokers who intermediate between the state and civil society, 
channeling resources down to a disorganized base.  This system involves a kind of 
unstable clientelism in which relationships between brokers and beneficiaries must be 
constantly renewed (Int. 29). 
It is also worth stressing that powerful interest groups are absent from the 
participatory institutions.  Examples relevant to this study include the alpaca fiber-
processing industries in Arequipa and the Yanacocha mine in Cajamarca, which has 
been the target of much protest.  These entities have other means of advancing their 
interests.  Although the participatory institutions were not meant to accommodate 
such powerful groups, their absence means that these new institutions cannot 
function to negotiate and coordinate among all of the relevant interests in the region.  
The most important decisions regarding allocation of resources will thus be made in 
other arenas where the popular sectors have only a weak, if any, voice. 
One final problem with the decentralization process must be mentioned that bears on 
possibilities for sustainable development: there are too many regions.  Informants 
assert that Peru should have somewhere between six and nine regions, far fewer than 
the 25 that were created out of convenience from the existing departments in the 
rush to decentralize (Int. 29, Int. 15, Int. 31, Int. 3).  Development planning must take Chapter II: National Political Context 
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place on a broader scale than that of the current regions.  Poorer regions such as Puno 
are not economically viable in isolation from their neighbors.  Puno’s livestock 
economy, for example, is closely linked to Arequipa; alpaca fiber produced in Puno is 
processed and marketed by industries located in Arequipa.
34  
 
                                                 
34There is recognition at the national level that there are too many regions, and significant financial incentives have been 
provided for regions to combine into larger political administrative units.  These incentives involve far greater resource 
transfers from the central government, including automatic shares of tax revenue.  In response to these incentives, there has 
been talk of creating macro-regions in the north and south of Peru.  The southern macro-region would ostensibly include 
Arequipa, Cuzco, Puno, and Tacna.  However, some experts do not expect that this consolidation will be realized.  Regional 
governments are interested in solidifying their new powers and will not want to voluntarily cede their autonomy to a new 
macro-regional government (Int. 29).  
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CHAPTER III: THE DAIRY SECTOR  
The dairy sector is of potential interest for the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative 
because it incorporates a large number of small producers.  Farmers with five or 
fewer cows account for fully 65% of all milk producers in Peru (Minag 2004b: 7).
35  
Further, 97% of all producers have fewer than 20 animals; these small and medium-
sized producers own 78% of Peru’s milk cows. In addition to its importance for small 
producers, there is significant potential for growth in the dairy sector, both for milk 
and cheese.   
This chapter provides an overview of the sector, the actors involved, and the major 
issues affecting prospects for small producers and development of the sector as a 
whole.  Although some possible lines of state action are noted below, for the most 
part, there does not seem to be a clear and compelling role for the state in promoting 
pro-poor development in the dairy sector, given current political and economic 
conditions.  
Section 1: Sectoral Background 
In 2003, the dairy sector accounted for about 4% of the total value of agricultural and 
livestock production.
36  Demand for milk products has outstripped national supply; in 
2000, for example, Peru imported $47,827 thousand dollars of milk.  A reduction in 
powdered milk imports between 1995 and 2001 of almost 50% has helped to stimulate 
domestic production of fresh milk in Peru.  From 2001 to 2002, production increased 
by 5%, and since 1993, production has grown at an average annual rate of 4.8%.  Minag 
notes that there is room for substantial growth in the dairy sector, given that milk 
consumption in Peru over the last decade has been only about half of the minimum of 
120 liters per person per year recommended by the FAO.  Indeed, Peru has one of the 
lowest levels of both milk production per capita and milk consumption per capita in 
South America.
37 
Peru’s main milk producing regions are Arequipa (22% of fresh milk production), 
Cajamarca (12%), and Lima (14%).  The majority (70%) of growth in the milk sector 
over the last decade has taken place in these three regions (Minag 2004b: 3).  The 
three main processing industries, the Peruvian company Gloria, the multinational 
Nestle, and the Chilean owned Laive, have a strong presence in these regions.
  In 
Cajamarca, for example, Nestle and Gloria together collect 300 thousand liters of milk 
per day (Nolte 2003).  Outside of Arequipa, Cajamarca, and Lima, where these 
processing industries do not have collection routes, milk producers supply small 
cheese factories or sell raw milk directly to consumers. 
Small milk producers in Cajamarca and Arequipa were hit hard by liberalization in the 
1990s.  Producer prices declined by almost 50% in real terms from 1990 to 1997 
(Crabtree 2002: 146).  And despite growth in the dairy sector in recent years, 
producer prices have remained low.  The processing industries determine prices based 
on factors including milk quality (acidity, fat and solid content), the producers’ 
distance from collection centers, and the volume available.  In 2003, the average 
national price for milk was 0.85 soles per liter (Minag 2004b: 4).
38 
                                                 
35The original text states that “65% of milk producers own five animals,” which the author assumes is a typological error. 
36In 2000, milk made up 8.5% of the livestock sector (Minag).   
37Sources: www.minag.gob.pe/pecuario.shtml, Minag 2004a, Minag 2004b. 
38Prices for raw milk vary from about 0.49 soles per liter in remote locations to 0.91 soles per liter closer to processing 
plants. Chapter III: The Dairy Sector 
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The cheese sector holds particular promise for providing opportunities for small 
producers. Though presently small, the cheese sector is growing, and experts sense a 
potential to develop both domestic and external markets for specialty cheeses 
produced in Peru’s numerous distinctive microclimates (Int. 1).  Further, small cheese 
factories pay good prices for milk (higher than what the processing industries offer), 
and they return the whey to the producers, which amounts to substantial additional 
income (Int. 1).
39  Consequently, Nolte expects cheese factories to become a 
noteworthy competitor with the milk processing industries in the future.  The main 
factors currently limiting development of the cheese sector include the lack of 
sanitation in small-scale cheese production,
40 the informal status of these factories, 
which prevents them from selling their goods to supermarkets, the small volumes of 
production, and the lack of distribution networks for their products (Int. 1, Int. 8).  
Numerous NGOs and international organizations, including the FAO, are presently 
involved in projects to promote cheese production. In various cases, these efforts 
have led to significant improvements in cheese quality as well as formalization of 
small cheese plants in terms of their legal standing with municipal governments, 
health authorities, and the tax agency (Int. 1).  
Section 2: Actors, Interest, and Policies  
The main actors in the milk sector are the processing industries and producers’ 
associations, with the balance of power firmly on the side of the industries.  Regional 
associations of small producers are particularly weak, whereas the new national level 
producers association appears to have at least a moderate degree of influence.  
Processing Industries 
Gloria is the biggest of the three processing industries; it controls about 70% of the 
dairy market (Int. 22).  It also operates one of the largest evaporated milk plants in 
the world and exports this product to emerging markets in the Caribbean, Central 
America, and Africa (Int. 22).  In addition, Gloria imports powdered milk from Bolivia 
(Int. 1), where it also has a significant presence (Fairfield 2004).  Gloria collects a 
total of about 1,200,000 liter of milk per day primarily from Arequipa, Lima, and 
Cajamarca, but also Trujillo, Chiclayo, and more recently, Junin (Int. 22).  
Nestle and Laive are of similar size.  Nestle collects approximately 240,000 liters per 
day primarily from Cajamarca, as well as Trujillo.  The company has also recently 
begun collection in Lima.  Laive collects about 200,000 liters per day principally in 
Arequipa.  Like Nestle, it is now entering Lima as well (Int. 22).  
Nestle is known for its focus on milk quality.  It pays its producers based on the 
temperature, fat, protein, and solid content of their milk upon collection.  The 
company also provides some technical assistance to its producers, although producers 
must pay for these services (Int. 1).  Nestle has continually expanded its collection 
routes within Cajamarca and Arequipa, but is apparently not interested in moving into 
other regions (Int. 1).  The company has also participated in a wide range of 
development projects with the state and NGOs, making it a potentially useful partner 
for the Pro-Poor Livestock Initiative.
41   
                                                 
39Whey can be used as a livestock feed, for example. Nolte estimates that a liter of whey is worth about 0.10 soles. 
40Unpasteurized or improperly handled cheese may transmit brucellosis and other diseases to consumers. 
41It should be noted, however, that due to time and resource constraints, representatives from the milk industry were not 
interviewed for this project. Chapter III: The Dairy Sector 
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G lo r i a  d o e s  no t  ha v e  t h e  s a m e  f o c u s  o n q uality as Nestle, partly due to its lower 
technical capacity, and it provides essentially no technical services to its producers 
(Int. 1, Int. 22).  The prices it pays for raw milk are slightly higher than Nestle’s.
42  
However, Gloria’s producer prices have remained essentially constant over the past 
six years, despite the fact that consumer prices have been increasing (Int. 22).  In 
contrast to Nestle, Gloria has shown a potential interest in expanding collection to 
other regions (Int. 1). 
Small Producers and Producers’ Associations  
In the past, Peru had strong regional milk producers’ associations, united at the 
national level by the organization Fondo Nacional para la Ganaderia Lechera (Fongal).  
However, this organization all but ceased to exist at the national level; its inscription 
in the public registry had lapsed for many years.  The regional Fongal chapters 
continued to exist and operate, but they too have been greatly weakened.
43   
Informants agree that the regional Fongales now have very little influence, although it 
is worth noting that there is variation in strength among them.  Fongal-Lima, for 
example, is relatively strong.  Fongal-Cajamarca, in contrast, is particularly weak; it 
suffers from mismanagement problems and infighting (Int. 22).  It is worth noting that 
Fongal-Cajamarca does not participate in that region’s CCR.  
 In 2004, a new milk producers’ association, the Asociación de Ganaderos Lecheros de 
Peru (AGALEP) was created in an effort to remedy the organizational vacuum at the 
national level.  AGALEP seems to have emerged largely at the initiative of Fongal-
Lima; indeed, the two organizations share the same president.  AGALEP is too new for 
an evaluation of its efforts; however, its president asserts that its work is progressing 
well.  AGALEP participates in Conveagro, and through this forum it is attempting to 
push the government to maintain protections for the internal market. It is also 
working with MINAG and the Agricultural Committee of the Peruvian congress to 
formally create a National Council on Milk (Consejo Nacional de la Leche).  This 
council would promote development of the dairy sector by promoting coordination 
between producers, the processing industries, and the government.  It will be 
modeled on similar institutions that operate in the US, Canada and European countries 
(Int. 22).   
Small Producers’ Interests and State Policies 
 The main complaint of small milk producers for years has been the price they receive 
for milk.  Gloria’s producer prices, for example, have remained essentially constant 
over the past six years, despite the fact that consumer prices have been increasing 
(Int. 22).
44  And Nestle is frequently accused of falsely claiming that milk quality is 
poor as an excuse to pay low prices, although the veracity of such complaints has 
never been proven (Int. 1).  These accusations aside, it is indeed the case that the 
vast majority of the profits in the milk sector— 75%— accrue to the processing 
industries (Nolte 2003: 68). 
A second issue of importance for small producers is the need for more small-scale 
collection centers to help bring their milk to the processing industries.  There is also a 
need for small processing plants and collections centers in regions where the major 
                                                 
42However, Gloria’s prices vary by season, whereas Nestle’s are stable year round (Int. 1). 
43Crabtree (2002: 154) presents a contrasting point of view.  He asserts that the Fongales were one of the more successful 
agricultural producers’ associations during the 1990s, and that they managed to mitigate some of the more devastating 
impacts of trade liberalization. 
44Producers worry about Gloria’s ability to abuse its position of dominance in the market (Int. 22). Chapter III: The Dairy Sector 
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industries do not operate.  Such infrastructure would stimulate small producers and 
would help supply municipalities with milk for distribution in the nutrition assistance 
program Vaso de Leche (see below) (Int. 22, Int. 26). 
A possible if improbable role for the state in addressing price problems, as suggested 
by one informant, is the establishment of centers in milk regions that could 
independently evaluate milk quality.  Given the strong move away from public sector 
provision of technical services, this idea does not appear to be feasible. There might 
be more potential for establishing such a solution at the regional level.  However, 
securing milk quality evaluation centers supported by the regional governments, as 
well as more small collection facilities, would require much more effective 
organization and capacity for political lobbying than small milk producers currently 
posses.
45    
Overall, the state is highly unlikely to undertake any action that might bring about a 
shift in profits shares in the milk sector in favor of small producers.  The neoliberal 
framework that prevails in Peru as well as small producers’ lack of political influence 
(both nationally and regionally) preclude state involvement in milk pricing disputes.  
As Nolte (2003: 68) observes, “The state has been increasingly weak in terms of 
regulating and creating conditions for equity in the market, especially in the milk 
sector.”
46  As such, the producers’ associations will have to resolve price disputes with 
the industries on their own.  Fongal-Lima may take the lead in such initiatives.  It has 
produced a study on milk prices and is currently lobbying Gloria to reevaluate its 
producer prices (Int. 22). 
Significant public involvement in the cheese sector seems equally unlikely at present.  
As previously noted, the state has moved away from providing the kind of services 
that might help to improve sanitary conditions in cheese production.  Small producers 
would certainly benefit from state efforts to promote the cheese sector, for example, 
through publicity campaigns or initiatives to create and regulate quality standards and 
brands of origin.  Such activities are within the realm of the state’s current activities.  
For example, a major public initiative was launched in 2004 to promote consumption 
of pisco, Peru’s national drink.  However, this campaign appears to have been driven 
largely by the economically strong and politically influential pisco producers.   
Prospects may be poor for a similar campaign in favor of the cheese sector, which 
lacks strong private sector actors. 
Shared Interests and State Policies 
Though prospects for improving the situation of small producers within the milk sector 
appear slim at present, both producers and the industries have a shared interest in 
promoting domestic milk production, and there have been interesting efforts to 
advance this agenda at the national level.  These efforts have focused on opposition 
to the Free Trade Treaty (FTT) with the US government and on pressuring the state to 
buy domestically produced milk to supply its nation-wide nutritional assistance 
programs (Int. 22). 
Free Trade Treaties. The dairy sector faces serious potential threats if free trade with 
the US and Peru’s neighbors in Mercosur becomes the norm.  Ultimately, imported 
milk from Mercosur countries may present the greater threat, given the much lower 
production costs in Argentina and Uruguay.  However, there was ample concern over 
the free trade treaty under negotiation with the US, due to the increased competition 
                                                 
45Another measure that would benefit small producers in the dairy sector would be encouraging Nestle and Gloria to expand 
their milk collecting operations.  Again, it is not clear what role the state could play in this matter, although this possibility 
was not explored during the author’s interviews. 
46“El Estado ha tenido una creciente debilidad frente a la normatividad y demás condiciones que velan por la equidad en las 
relaciones del mercado interno, especialmente en el tema de la leche.” Chapter III: The Dairy Sector 
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it would initiate with Peruvian milk and cheese.  Similar concerns regarding increased 
competition were shared by the other agricultural sectors represented in Conveagro.  
As of early 2005, Peru’s milk sector was protected by a 25% tariff on imported milk 
products and an additional system of variable surcharges (the franja de precios) that 
fluctuated between a minimum and maximum rate in accordance with the 
international price of powdered milk.  The lower the powdered milk price, the higher 
the additional tariff, in order to protect Peruvian producers from international 
dumping.  In March of 2004, for example, the total tariff on milk products reached 
40%.  Agreements with the WTO permitted tariff protections of up to 68% (Minag 
2004b: 5).  As a consequence of these tariff policies, milk imports had decreased 
during the early years of the 21st century.  However, a free trade treaty with the US 
would spell the end of the variable surcharges and a reduction of tariffs on milk 
imports.  Indeed, the US intransigently demanded these conditions, all the while 
refusing to negotiate its own policy of subsidizing milk production (Int. 22).   
Milk sector representatives hoped that Peru’s negotiating team would secure a deal 
with the US to define fixed quotas for the import of milk products. One informant 
asserted that milk and cheese imports from the US in their present volumes did not 
threaten Peru’s milk sector, but a significant increase in the future would cause 
problems (Int. 22).  He appeared confident that such a system of quotas would be 
achieved in the negotiations, although this outcome was far from certain at the time 
of this writing.  
In conclusion, there is a clear role for the central government to play in protecting the 
shared interests of milk and other domestically-oriented agricultural producers: 
maintaining  reasonable protections from subsidized US products for the internal 
market.  Whether or not the government will oblige depends largely on the 
organizational strength and strategic prowess of Conveagro, as well as the magnitude 
of international pressures.  At the time of this writing, the free trade treaty with the 
U S  s e e m e d  l i k e l y  t o  m o v e  f o r w a r d .   T o l e do had invested significant resources in 
vigorously promoting the initiative (Int. 5).
47  The consequences of Peru’s entry into 
Mercosur, another of Toledo’s accomplishments, however, had not yet been 
determined.  The initial agreement did not include specifics on tariff barriers and 
protections.  These issues will doubtless come up for discussion in the future.  
Public Nutrition Programs.  Two state social assistance programs, Vaso de Leche (Glass 
of Milk), and Desayuno Escolar (School Breakfast), purchase milk from the processing 
industries, and in some cases directly from small producers for distribution to poor 
children.  Vaso de Leche is now run by the municipalities, and Desayuno Escolar is 
managed by the Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria (Pronaa), a subsidized 
food program for the poor which depends on the Women’s Ministry (Ministerio de la 
Mujer) but has been decentralized to the regions.  Desayuno Escolar provides milk as a 
nutritional supplement to school-aged children up to 14 years old (Nolte 2003: 43).  
These programs are an important additional source of demand for nationally produced 
milk.
48 
In the past, however, much of what these social programs actually purchased and 
distributed was not fresh milk, but “productos enriquecidos lacteos,” milk substitutes 
produced from imported goods: powdered milk, soy, and other grains (Int. 22).  The 
milk substitute business started up in the mid-1990s primarily to supply the state 
social programs.  The state responded favorably to their offerings because these 
substitutes are cheaper than fresh milk (Int. 22).  However, despite the fact that they 
contain the same percentages of protein, fat, and nutrients, dairy advocates maintain 
                                                 
47One informant felt that Toledo viewed such free trade treaties as an important part of his legacy (Int. 22). 
48Many municipal governments purchase milk locally for their Vaso de Leche programs (Nolte 2003). Nolte (2003: 43) and 
Crabtree note that Vaso de Leche and Pronaa have tended to pay higher than market prices for milk. Chapter III: The Dairy Sector 
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that the substitutes are nutritionally inferior to fresh milk because the amino acid 
spectra are quite different (Int. 22). 
The milk industries and producers coincided in their opposition to the use of milk 
substitutes by the social programs, and their lobbying efforts have secured some 
concrete achievements.  Together, Gloria and Fongal-Lima demanded that the state 
purchase only domestically produced fresh milk.  Local Mother’s Committees, which 
are involved in administering some of the social programs (Desayuno Escolares), 
proved important grass-roots allies for the milk sector.  They reportedly pressured 
public officials to move from substitutes to fresh milk, based on nutritional 
considerations (Int. 22).  These efforts were rewarded with the passage of Law 27470 
in 2001 and Law 27767 in 2002, which require the social programs to use nationally 
produced milk.  Substitute products are still permitted when necessary, but they must 
be nationally produced as well (Int. 26).  A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  e f f o r t s ,  G l o r i a  h a s  
increased its supply of milk to the social programs (Int. 22).   
Passage of the two laws, however, has not entirely resolved the problems.  The social 
programs are reportedly still purchasing substitutes, and Fongal-Lima is currently 
pushing for the laws to be enforced in favor of fresh milk (Int. 22).  The milk 
substitute producers appear to have significant political and economic influence.   
They are powerful actors with diversified economic interests who have established 
special facilities to process their products, and they are likely to energetically fight 
the milk sector’s threat to its market. 
In conclusion, pro-poor development in the milk sector depends largely on 
strengthening producer’s associations at both the regional and national levels.
49  It is 
these organizations that must push the industries to improve producers’ prices and, in 
alliance with the milk industries, lobby the state to pay more attention to the internal 
market and abide by its legal promise to purchase domestic milk for the food-
assistance programs.  On each of these agenda items, there are strong countervailing 
interest groups that will have to be fought. 
 
                                                 
49The author is not advocating a return to gremial or collective models of the past.  Informants note that that these models 
are in decline and are not popular among small producers themselves (Int. 1).  Associations today may need to focus more 
around issues of successful production and business promotion.  The important point is that they need to develop the 
capacity to lobby local and national governments to implement policies that are critical to their production needs.   
31 
CHAPTER IV: THE ALPACA SECTOR 
Alpaca herders are among the poorest of Peru’s small rural producers.  Accordingly, 
this chapter discusses the alpaca fiber and meat sectors, with an emphasis on the 
politics of the fiber sector.  Despite decades of exploitation and marginalization of 
small alpaca herders, recent developments in the fiber sector have opened up new if 
tenuous possibilities for improving their welfare. 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 1 provides background on the camelid 
sector in Peru, including the vicuña sector.  Although the politics of the vicuña fiber 
sector are interesting and worthy of attention, the sector is quite small, and space 
constraints unfortunately preclude a detailed discussion thereof.  Section 2 discusses 
the alpaca fiber sector in depth.  After considering the problems facing small 
producers and the historical configuration of power within the sector, the major 
actors and their interests are analyzed.  Also discussed are various initiatives 
spearheaded by Conacs, with participation by other actors, to promote coordination in 
the sector and to advance the interests of small herders.  A complementary overview 
of the difficult political situation in Puno, a key region for any pro-poor development 
initiative focused on the alpaca sector, can be found in Appendix B.  Finally, Section 3 
explores the potential of various alpaca meat sector initiatives to benefit small 
herders. 
Section 1: Sectoral Background 
The camelid sector in Peru is made up of alpacas, vicuñas, and llamas.  Alpacas are 
the most numerous species; the country has an estimated 3 million alpacas and one 
million llamas.
50  Vicuñas are an endangered species of wild camelid whose numbers 
have been recovering over the past decade due to state protection.  
Economics  
The majority of the economic value derived from the camelid sector is to be found in 
fiber.  Alpaca fiber is particularly important.  About 90% of alpaca fiber is exported in 
the form of tops (brushed fiber, or topes), yarn, and to a lesser degree, finished 
textile goods.  Semi-processed fiber (tops) represented 67% of fiber exports and yarn 
(hilados) 29% in 2001.
51  China, Italy and Japan are the main importers of Peruvian 
alpaca fiber.  Production volumes in 2001 amounted to about 3394 tons of alpaca 
fiber, a quantity that has been more or less stagnant since 1996; yearly production has 
fluctuated slightly around an average of 3,369 tons.  Llama fiber, given the current 
state of technology, is of lower quality than alpaca fiber and is produced in much 
smaller quantities.  Vicuña fiber is one of the finest in the world and has been legally 
tradable on the international market since 1994.  Capture and sheering of the animals 
is supervised by the state to ensure that the fiber originates from live animals.  About 
three tons of vicuña fiber were produced in 2000.   
Alpaca fiber prices have been highly volatile throughout the history of the fiber 
industry, due to the limited volume of fiber available, changes in demand on the 
world market, and speculation.  As alpaca fiber becomes popular with the 
international fashion industry, demand grows and fiber prices increase.  As the fiber 
industries sell down their accumulated stock, demand outstrips supply, and prices 
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continue to increase.  The high prices then encourage designers to use alternative 
fibers such as mohair, cashmere and fine wool, and alpaca fiber prices plummet 
accordingly.  Fiber prices thus vary cyclically, with a period of four to five years (Int. 
13, Safley 2001: 112).  Speculation by the industries and intermediaries who purchase 
raw fiber exacerbates these fluctuations.  Industries and intermediaries purchase fiber 
from alpaca herders when prices are low and wait to sell until international prices 
begin to peak. 
Alpacas and llamas are also used for meat.  In 2001, 8271 tons of alpaca meat and 
3209 tons of llama meat were produced.
52  In terms of value, however, camelid meat 
is marginal, constituting only 1.4% of the meat sector.  Camelid meat is largely traded 
in informal markets.  As in Bolivia, there are strong prejudices against camelid meat 
that are intimately linked to racism against the indigenous populations that have 
traditionally consumed them (Fairfield 2004).  Most alpaca meat is consumed as 
charqui, which is dried and salted.  Animal hides, meanwhile, largely go to waste, 
despite potential but undeveloped markets for leather.   
The Alpaqueros 
Alpaca herders, known as alpaqueros, are found primarily in the southern regions of 
Puno, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Arequipa and Cuzco.  Puno has 60-80% of Peru's 
alpacas and is home to the largest population of alpaqueros (Int. 13, Int. 37).   
The alpaca sector is dominated by small producers, although there is significant 
socioeconomic variation among herders.  An average alpaquero family owns 80 
animals; families with fewer than 100 animals represent 80 to 90% of all producers 
(Int. 37).  However, a small proportion of families own 400 or more animals and have 
much greater economic opportunities.  Alpaqueros with fewer than 100 animals are 
engaged in subsistence production.  A herd size of less than 100 animals is considered 
too small to maintain good genetic quality, unless reproducers are regularly 
exchanged with other herds.  In some very poor regions, families may own as few as 
20 animals.  Further, there exists an even more marginalized population known as 
pastores (shepherds or pastors) who do not own their own animals, but instead care 
for an absent owner's herds.  Pastores a r e  t o  b e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  m o s t  r e m o t e  a n d  
elevated areas of Puno.  They are marginalized both economically and socially; the 
villages they serve do not consider the pastores to be members of their community, 
nor do they admit the existence of the pastores to organizations or NGOs that work 
with the villages.  As such, there are no estimates to date of how many pastores exist.  
The pastores embody the exploitation of the poorest of the alpaqueros by the poor 
(Int. 41).  
Unquestionably, the vast majority of alpaqueros live in extreme poverty.  Estimates of 
income for a typical family with about 80 animals range from $345 to $800 per year 
(Int. 37, Int. 43, Int. 34).  On the low end, a Conacs representative estimates income 
from fiber at a mere $122 per year, with a total annual income of only $345 from all 
sources, including fiber, meat, and sale of live animals (Int. 37 3/5).  Some studies, 
however, have concluded that small alpaca herders receive about half of their income 
from fiber and about half from meat (Toro et al 2001: 23, Int. 13, Int. 4).  The 
following section focuses on fiber production problems experienced by alpaqueros; 
issues surrounding alpaca meat production will be discussed separately in Section 3.  
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Section 2: Alpaca Fiber Sector 
Producers' Problems 
Small alpaca herders face numerous problems that limit their economic possibilities in 
the fiber sector.  Most important among these are animal health issues and poor 
management practices that reduce fiber quality. First, alpacas suffer from scabies 
(sarna), an external parasite that damages their fiber.  Vaccines and best 
management practices are available to control scabies; however, animal health 
services for the most part have not reached small producers.  Second, high levels of 
interbreeding are found within herds.  This problem is particularly marked in herds of 
100 or fewer animals.  Alpacas also crossbreed with llamas, bearing offspring of lower 
fiber quality.  Moreover, large numbers of high quality alpacas have been exported 
both legally, and in larger numbers, illegally, over the past several decades.
53  As a 
consequence, Peru's genetic stock has deteriorated.  There are few alpacas of high 
genetic quality left in the country, and alpaca fiber has grown continually coarser, 
reducing its value on the international market.   
The deterioration of fiber quality due to the disease and management problems 
discussed above has contributed to the primary difficulty that faces alpaqueros today: 
low prices for fiber.  Over the past decade, fiber prices have declined as the 
international fashion market has increasingly favored ever finer, lighter fibers.
54  
However, as will be discussed below, low prices for fiber do not reflect market trends 
and declining fiber quality alone.  A complicated fiber-collection system, made up of 
an oligopsony of three processing industries and an extensive network of 
intermediaries, has contributed to the low producers’ prices since the 1960s.    
The Historical Configuration of Power in the Fiber Sector  
Throughout the history of the fiber sector, three companies have dominated the 
processing industry: Michell and Co, Grupo Inca (Incatops and Incalpaca), and 
Productos del Sur (Prosur).  These companies were founded and are still owned by 
elite families living in Arequipa.  Michell and Co was founded in 1946 by Englishman 
Frank Michell.  It remains the largest fiber company today, controlling 55% of fiber 
exports.
55  Prosur also has a long trajectory in the fiber business; it was founded in 
1954 and now controls 23% of fiber exports.  Grupo Inca, also formed in the 1950s, is 
the smallest of the three companies (11% of exports).  In contrast to Michell, which 
processes high volumes of fiber, Inca has specialized in top quality fiber and 
production of finished products for market (Int. 13 3/10).
56  Grupo Inca’s strategy has 
been so successful that it has been able to diversify into other economic activities, 
which include an ostrich farm in Arequipa.  Michell has also diversified; in the 1980s, 
it expanded into insurance, finance, and natural resources (Safley 2001: 123).  These 
three companies are powerful Peruvian transnationals with their own networks of 
international brokers and stores abroad that purchase their products (Int. 7, Int. 4).   
Agrarian reform in the late 1960s broke up Peru’s expansive haciendas and seized 
large alpaca herds from their owners.  Various types of collective land ownership and 
alpaca co-ops were formed thereafter.  In the 1980s and 1990s, most of these 
collectives were dissolved in favor of land parcelization and individual ownership, 
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though a handful of more successful collectives, such as Rural Alianza, remain in 
operation.  The overarching consequence of these dramatic changes in land tenure 
was the creation of numerous small, dispersed alpaca herders. 
The geographic dispersion and isolation of these small herders created a major 
problem for both the fiber industry and the producers: how to amass the raw fiber and 
bring it to Arequipa for processing.  A complicated network of intermediaries evolved 
to address this problem.  Small intermediaries travel in remote regions collecting fiber 
through a combination of cash payments and barter of basic goods to which 
alpaqueros may not otherwise have access.  These intermediaries then sell the raw 
fiber either to larger intermediaries, who eventually sell to the processing companies, 
or to commission agents directly employed by the industries.
57  This system of fiber 
collection, which has operated for 40 to 50 years, was reinforced in the 1980s during 
the height of Sendero Luminoso's terrorist activities in the countryside (Int. 34).  Only 
the small and medium intermediaries were willing and able to travel within these 
regions to collect fiber.  During this time, Sendero activists killed several 
representatives of the fiber industries, including managers of an alpaca-breeding 
center in the highlands (along with many more civilians, development workers, and 
civil society leaders).
58  
Although the intermediaries have served an important function, experts assert that 
they are the source of fundamental problems in the fiber chain.  The intermediaries 
capture much of the value of the fiber themselves, leaving small producers with poor 
prices.  Intermediaries have a much stronger bargaining position than small producers, 
due to information asymmetries regarding fiber prices and the isolated producers’ 
dependence on their services.  Providing basic goods as a partial payment for fiber 
also helps to suppress prices (Safely 2001).  Speculation by larger intermediaries might 
create price distortions that hurt producers as well. 
Moreover, it is frequently alleged that there are close ties between mid-level 
managers (mandos medios) in the processing industries and the intermediaries that 
lead to additional price distortions and help perpetuate an economically inefficient 
collection system.  Various intermediaries and mid-level managers are linked either by 
blood ties or through relationships of compadrazgo.  They may receive mutual 
economic benefits from business dealings in which intermediaries sell fiber to the 
industries at inflated prices.  The mid-level managers involved may benefit in several 
ways: either because they are direct relations of the intermediaries, or otherwise take 
a cut in the latter’s profits, or because the industry managers know they can count on 
the intermediaries for loans or other assistance in the future.  The mid-level managers 
thus have strong incentives to maintain the position of the intermediaries in the fiber 
chain.
59  Experts assert that the existence of such ties between intermediaries and the 
industries undermines the development of a smoothly-functioning free market in 
alpaca fiber.   
It is also important to note that the three oligopsonic processing companies are 
constantly accused by alpaqueros, NGOs, and outside observers of collaborating to fix 
fiber prices (Int. 4, Int. 20, Safley 2001).  Given the wide variety of informants and 
experts who put forth this thesis, it is quite probable that companies have indeed 
attempted to engage in price fixing; however, it is less likely that mechanisms exist to 
enforce price agreements.  The finest, most desirable fiber constitutes such a small 
percentage of the market that each company has incentives to buy as much of it as 
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possible, at higher prices if necessary.  The perception that the industries set prices 
may be more a reflection of their economic and political power within the sector vis a 
vis the poor producers, as well as their historic lack of concern for the well-being of 
the latter, rather than any true capacity to artificially depress fiber prices.  At any 
rate, the industries have certainly captured the majority of the profits generated in 
the alpaca fiber sector throughout its history.  The industries have traditionally 
purchased high volumes of raw fiber when prices are low, building up their stock and 
waiting to sell until international prices are high; during such boom periods, they have 
not paid higher prices to producers (Safley 2001: 113).  
Indeed, the industries have a longstanding and widespread reputation for a lack of 
social responsibility and underinvestment in the fiber sector.
60  Whether or not the 
industries are at fault for not concerning themselves more with the basic welfare of 
small herders, it seems that they do bear a significant portion of the blame for the 
deterioration of fiber quality, due to their lack of investment in the producers and 
their prior lack of concern for fiber quality.  For decades, fiber was purchased in bulk 
by weight, unsorted, and without any price differentiation for quality.  Industry 
employees separated coarser fiber from fine fiber after purchase.  This system 
provided no incentives for herders to pay attention to fiber quality and genetic 
management.  Instead, producers as well as intermediaries commonly adulterated 
fiber with dirt or other additives to artificially increase its weight.  The majority of 
fiber today is still purchased in bulk by weight.
61  
Given the above problems, several Peruvian governments have attempted to intervene 
in the fiber sector in order to correct distortions, increase producer prices, and 
thereby to improve the situation of the poor herders.  In 1975, the military 
government established Alpaca Peru EPS, a state owned fiber-purchasing company.  It 
managed to become the most important buyer for a time; however, it was liquidated 
in the early 1980s (Safley 2001: 115).  Fujimori, despite his generally neoliberal 
orientation, authorized the state to resume the purchase of fiber in 1997 through the 
UOPE (Unidad Operativa de Proyectos Especiales).  This initiative was one element of 
Fujimori’s neopopulist reelection campaign.  Neither of these efforts successfully 
remedied the problems within the sector.  B o t h  A l p a c a  P e r u  a n d  U O P E  h e l p e d  t o  
increase fiber prices, but their operations amounted to unsustainable subsidies for 
producers.  UOPE was particularly unsuccessful since it ultimately sold its fiber to the 
three processing industries—at lower prices than it had purchased from the producers. 
The state has also attempted to work with the processing industries on another 
problem that has held back the fiber sector: the lack of a uniform standard for 
classifying fiber quality.  Each industry has its own classification system, which makes 
it difficult for producers to gain value-added by sorting fiber before selling to the 
industries.  Some informants thus hold that this system enhances the negotiating 
position of the industries in relation to the producers (Int. 7).  One informant noted 
that a concerted government effort under Fujimori to promote a uniform standard 
failed due to lack of interest on the part of the industries (Int. 4).     
Numerous efforts by NGOs to work with alpaqueros in the past decades have also 
failed to have any real impact on the herders’ income.  One highly respected such 
NGO, Desco, all but abandoned its efforts to work in the fiber sector in the mid 90s, 
citing the industries’ bad attitude toward the producers and their control over the 
market as insurmountable obstacles (Int. 4).  Desco accordingly shifted its focus from 
alpaca fiber to alpaca meat production in the 1990s.
62 
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The history of attempts to improve the plight of small alpaca herders is thus 
discouraging.  In recent decades, large amounts of money have been invested in the 
alpaca sector.  Casual estimates put the sum at between 70 and 100 million dollars, 
including state and private efforts (Int. 13, Int. 21).  Yet the results have been nil; 
fiber prices remain low, producers are still poorly organized, and standards of living 
have not improved.    
However, recent changes in the sector provide grounds for very cautious optimism.  
Over the last decade, the industries have become extremely concerned with fiber 
quality, due to the increasing importance of fineness for value on the international 
market since the 1990s and the advances that have been made in other top quality 
fibers such as cashmere, South African mohair and Australian wool (Int. 13).  Industry 
leaders are aware that if alpaca fiber quality does not improve, they will have no 
business in the future.  This awareness, in combination with new leadership and 
changes in strategy within both Conacs and Spar—the national organization 
representing alpaqueros—have created a modest window of opportunity for progress 
to be made in improving the situation of small herders.  The present state of affairs, 
the actors in the alpaca fiber sector, and their interests are the subject of the 
following sections. 
Modern-Day Actors and Interests  
The main actors in the alpaca sector—the industries, alpaquero associations, and the 
state—at least in theory share three key interests.  The first of these is liberalizing the 
fiber commercialization system by loosening the intermediaries’ hold on fiber 
collection.  The intermediaries act to both lower producers prices and to increase the 
industries’ costs by jacking up fiber prices and controlling the supply.  There are 
however some important caveats related to the industries’ interests in this matter 
that are discussed below.  Second, all actors have an interest, albeit to different 
degrees, in promoting efficient organization of small producers.  If small producers 
were better organized and able to offer larger quantities of fiber to the industry at 
fewer points of sale, the industries would in theory have to expend fewer resources in 
acquiring their raw materials.  From the point of view of small alpaqueros, better 
organization would improve their negotiating power relative to the industries and 
would open up new economic possibilities.  Further, both Conacs and Spar would 
benefit from having a more organized small producer constituency with which to 
work.  Finally, investing to improve fiber quality is in the interest of every actor 
involved in the sector.  The only problematic issue on this front is from whence the 
funds can and should come.   
Were these three shared interests to be realized, the livelihoods of small alpaca 
herders would no doubt improve.  Producers’ prices would increase, and alpaqueros 
would be in a better position to lobby the state and the industries in favor of their 
interests.  This section analyzes prospects for realizing these goal and the specific 
positions of each of the main actors on the key issues facing the sector. 
The Industries   
Two factors have contributed to a somewhat greater openness on the part of the 
industries to working with the state and producers in the alpaca sector.  First, as 
noted above, the industries have become acutely aware of the need to improve fiber 
quality.  That objective necessitates genetic improvement programs that will 
eventually have to involve alpaqueros at large, as well as technical extension for small 
producers.  Second, a new generation has assumed leadership within the industries.  
In the case of Michell and ProSur, these are grandchildren of the founders; the Inca 
group is now hiring managers from outside the ownership family.  Conacs Chapter IV: The Alpaca Sector 
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representatives note that these younger leaders and new managers have a more 
modern and open attitude toward producers and the state (Int. 13).  
Positive steps taken by the industries include the formation of a semi-independent 
non-profit organization, the Instituto Peruano de Alpacas y Camelidos (IPAC), that is 
participating in forums organized by Conacs to promote coordination and articulation 
of the alpaca fiber chain.  IPAC has also participated in Conacs’ initiatives to liberalize 
the raw fiber marketing system, in addition to pursuing various projects of its own 
(see below).  The formation of IPAC has contributed to greater communication 
between the state and the industries, which pleases both parties (Int. 32, Int. 13).   
However, the industries are not clearly committed to policies that would improve the 
situation of small producers.  First, the new industry leadership does not appear to 
have brought significant change to the businesses’ stance regarding the welfare of 
small alpaqueros.  Representatives assert that the industries’ bad reputation, of which 
they are acutely aware, is unfounded (Int. 32).  They maintain that the industries 
cannot be held solely responsible for the welfare of the alpaqueros.  In their view, 
families with fewer than 100 animals will never be able to live from the sale of alpaca 
fiber alone, and it is the responsibility of other actors to promote diversified rural 
development to improve these families’ plight (Int. 32).  The industries do provide 
some support to alpaquero associations from which they buy, but it appears to be 
minimal (Int. 35, Int. 37).   
Second, the industries are willing to pay higher fiber prices only as quality improves 
(Int. 33, Int. 32).
63 Accordingly, they have resisted raw fiber marketing schemes 
designed to raise producer prices by circumventing intermediaries, despite their (at 
least informal) commitment to such initiatives.  The industries insist that fiber prices 
are not artificially low; they are set by the international market and reflect poor fiber 
quality.    
Nor do the industries seem committed to serious investment in the sector, despite the 
fact that it is imperative to their very survival as profit seeking enterprises.  Their 
representatives assert that the industries do not have sufficient funds to carry out 
genetic improvement research and technical extension on their own (Int. 32), 
although each does have its own alpaca-breeding center in the countryside. The 
industries want the state to invest on their behalf, through the national budget or by 
seeking external funding (Int. 32, Int. 33).  
Even industry investment in IPAC appears to be minimal.  In contrast to the plush, 
luxurious offices of Michell, IPAC’s facilities are quite modest and its staff small.  Its 
office, which shares a floor with other operations, is located on a side street by the 
Michell complex, with an unmarked entryway.  Were IPAC the policy front of the 
industries as the latter assert (Int. 32), it would certainly have a higher profile.  
Finally, links between the industries and the intermediaries are still strong.  Both 
industry managers and intermediaries who are involved are reportedly able to put 
significant pressure on the industries to maintain the present system of fiber 
collection and commercialization, despite the fact that the industries would seem to 
have a strong economic interest in making that system more open and efficient.  In 
the case of Michell, this problem is also related to the fact that the company’s 
strategy is based on processing large volumes of fiber.  Consequently, it is more 
reliant on the intermediaries to provide it with sufficient quantities of fiber. 
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Instituto Peruano de Alpacas y Camelidos (IPAC) 
The Instituto Peruano de Alpacas y Camelidos (IPAC) was founded in 2001 as a joint 
initiative between the industries, the government Commission for the Promotion of 
Exports (Comisión para la Promoción de Exportaciones, PROMPEX), and the Ministry of 
Production (Int. 13 2/9).  It is now a private non-profit institution that receives 
funding primarily from the industries.   
IPAC is involved in a number of projects at different stages of operation.  One of its 
most important activities is collaboration with Conacs to establish fiber collection 
centers and public auctions designed to liberalize the fiber market.  IPAC also hosts 
the Centro de Inovación Tecnologica Industria Textil Camélidos del Perú (CITE Textile) 
in coordination with the Ministry of Production, which designates technological 
innovation centers that service production chains of national interest.  Through CITE 
Textile, IPAC wants to provide services and technical support in animal management, 
fiber classification, processing, and textile manufacturing and artisanry.  However, as 
yet, these projects exist on paper only.  IPAC is seeking funds for these planned 
activities from the private sector and international cooperation sources, since the 
industries have not invested sufficient resources to make CITE operational.  IPAC has 
obtained funds from the IDB for another project, Cluster Alpaca, which is intended to 
stimulate artisan production of alpaca fiber garments, and thereby stimulate demand 
for fiber and generate more value added within Peru.  In addition, IPAC has carried 
out several analyses of the fiber market and production chain for the industries.  
IPAC is itself an actor in the alpaca sector, with its own interests of institutional 
survival and growth.  It is actively seeking international recognition and external 
resources.  Almost all informants (public functionaries, producers, and outside 
observers) note that its interests are closely tied to those of the industries, despite 
IPAC’s efforts to sell itself as an institution that represents both industry and 
producers.  The organization’s location in the Michell factory complex, and its 
representatives’ reluctance to disclose the names of member producers’ associations, 
attest to this fact.
64   
From the point of view of this project, IPAC’s strengths include its willingness to 
collaborate with Conacs and its ability to serve as a communication channel between 
the state and the industries.  Its weaknesses, however, include insufficient funding, 
lack of participation from alpaqueros, little presence in the sector beyond national 
policy circles and glossy brochures, a bureaucratic operational style, and hence a 
limited capacity to execute projects of consequence to alpaqueros and artisans on the 
ground.  Without greater financial support from the industries or loans from 
international entities, IPAC’s future seems restricted.   
Producers Associations 
In general, alpaquero associations are quite weak and lack both political and 
economic influence.  Producers are widely dispersed, and most existing associations 
have not been able to significantly advance their members’ interests.  These 
statements are particularly true of alpaquero associations in Puno (see Appendix A for 
more information).  Importantly, however, there is also a national level producers’ 
association, the Sociedad Peruana de Criadores de Alpacas Registrados (SPAR), which 
holds some promise for organizing alpaqueros throughout the country. 
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SPAR began as an organization of producers and merchants (comercientes) involved in 
the export of live alpacas.  Until recently, the organization was fraught with 
accusations of corruption, including the illegal export of alpacas for the benefit of the 
leaders.  Consequently, many alpaqueros today still perceive SPAR as representing 
primarily merchants who have benefited from the trade in live animals (Int. 26).   
However, a new, young, and motivated leadership assumed control of SPAR in 2004 
and has since taken steps to become an organization that truly represents the small 
alpaca herders.  The individuals accused of involvement in corruption have left the 
organization.  SPAR is now receiving technical assistance from the Dutch agency for 
international cooperation and has developed a strategic plan to pursue its goals. 
Consultants who have worked with SPAR assert that it does indeed have the requisite 
will to organize alpaqueros (Int. 20). 
These changes within SPAR are encouraging in regard to its prospects for representing 
the interests of alpaqueros, particularly at the national level, where SPAR has 
significant presence.  It has been working closely with Conacs to promote coordination 
in the sector and to establish a more efficient and producer-friendly fiber marketing 
system.  SPAR is also an active participant in Conveagro, and in 2005, its delegate 
served as the vice president of Conveagro’s directive board.  Observers assert that 
SPAR also has good working relations with fiber industry representatives (Int. 20).   
SPAR does suffer from a number of limitations, however.  The change in leadership 
and orientation is very recent.  SPAR does not have its own base level organizations, 
and its ties to existing alpaquero associations are weak.  SPAR asserts that it has 
15,000 member (asociados directos inscritos), which represents only about 8% of 
alpaquero families (around 180,000 total in Peru).  To their credit, SPAR leaders are 
well aware of and openly acknowledge these problems (Int. 21).  Most worrisome is 
the fact that SPAR does not have sufficient funds to execute its strategic plans, which 
include efforts to link the association down to alpaqueros at the base level.  It should 
also be noted that according to one informed observer, SPAR leaders are on such 
friendly terms with industry representatives that they sometimes neglect to pressure 
them in favor of producers’ interests (Int. 20).      
Consejo Nacional de Camélidos Sudamericanos (Conacs) 
Concas, an OPD of Minag, operates at both the national and the regional levels.  At 
the national level, its headquarters are executing several interesting initiatives with 
the alpaca sector.  At the regional level, particularly in Puno, Conacs is said to be the 
only organization, public or private, that has the capacity to and does in fact reach 
small alpaqueros. 
Conacs Lima (National Headquarters).  Like SPAR, Conacs has undergone changes in 
staff and orientation that have given it the potential to become a much more 
respected and effective public agency.  Before 2000, Conacs had a poor reputation 
and accomplished little for alpaca producers.  Former president Alfonso Martinez, for 
example, has been accused of taking advantage of his position for personal economic 
gain.  He was removed in 2000 when Paneagua took over as president after Fujimori 
fled the country.
65  In January 2004, Wilder Trejos assumed direction of Conacs after a 
shake-up within Minag perpetrated by a change of the minister.  Trejos is a camelid 
specialist with over 30 years of experience who had previously headed Conacs’ 
Domestic Camelids program, and he has brought a solid team of professionals to the 
agency.  Informants commend Trejos’ leadership and the capacity of Conacs’ new 
technical team (Int. 37). 
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Since 2004, Conacs has received technical support from the Dutch agency for 
international cooperation (SNV Netherlands) in devising strategic plans and training 
staff to be able to carry out the new roles envisioned for the institution.  In the past, 
Conacs’ regional offices provided technical extension services to alpaqueros in the 
countryside.  However, Conacs has shifted to a role of promoting coordination in the 
alpaca sector and articulating the production chain, in line with Minag’s directive that 
none of its agencies should directly provide services, since with decentralization, 
service provision is now the responsibility of either regional governments or private 
actors.  Conacs representatives still see their end goal as improving the welfare of the 
alpaqueros.  But in order to promote articulation within the fiber chain, they have 
assumed a neutral stance with all actors in the sector, attempting in particular to 
build good working relations with the industries, rather than treating them as 
antagonists, as informants assert Conacs had done in the past (Int. 13).  In this 
manner, Conacs is attempting to quell polarization in the sector between the 
industries (which are demanding finer fiber) and the producers (who clamor for higher 
fiber prices).  
In April 2004, Conacs, along with SPAR, IPAC and the Ministry of Production, convoked 
a national forum known as the Comisión Nacional del Alpaca (Conalpaca) to bring 
together actors in the sector and promote strategic planning.  Conacs wishes 
Conalpaca to function in a manner similar to the Pisco Commission, which has 
spearheaded a highly successful campaign to promote consumption of the Peruvian 
beverage pisco sour.  However, Conalpaca has yet to be formally recognized by the 
government.
66   
In 2004, Conalpaca held a series of workshops with participation from a large number 
of entities involved in the alpaca sector, including representatives from all relevant 
public agencies, producers, industries, and academics.  The end product of these 
workshops was the National Strategy for the Development of Domestic Camels 
(Estrategia Nacional del Desarrollo de los Camelidos Domesticos).
67  The significance 
of this document is unclear, given the recent proliferation of national dialogs and 
participatory forums in Peru and the ensuing consensus documents that often do not 
constitute substantive achievements or attain political influence.  Like the Carta 
Verde, most of the National Strategy document’s objectives are quite general.  It does 
attempt to assign leadership responsibility for the various recommended lines of 
action to specific participants; however, the Arequipa fiber industries, apart from 
IPAC, are not mentioned (Conacs 2004a).  At the least, the National Strategy 
document can be seen as a production first step in convening representatives from all 
interests within the sector, who had never before worked together, and agreeing on 
very basic shared objectives.  
Conacs’ most interesting initiative from the point of view of this study is the National 
System for Collection and Commercialization of Alpaca Fiber (Sistema Nacional de 
Acopio y Remate de Fibra).  This joint initiative between Conacs, SPAR, IPAC, and to a 
lesser degree, the Ministry of Production, is intended to improve efficiency of fiber 
commercialization by establishing fiber collection centers throughout alpaca regions 
that will amass fiber in bulk and then sell directly to the industries or other interested 
buyers through public auctions or other mechanisms.  The desire of SPAR and Conacs 
is to help break the hold of the intermediaries, liberalize commercialization, and 
ultimately increase producer prices.  Conacs envisions that these collection centers 
will eventually provide a range of services to alpaqueros as well.  Given its 
importance, this initiative is discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.  
Despite Conacs’ significant potential, there are several problems that may interfere 
with its ability to promote coordination in the alpaca sector and improve the position 
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of small producers.  These include an insufficient budget, the threat of political 
interference due to the instability within Minag, and a limited capacity to enforce 
agreements and act as a regulatory agency.   
First, Conacs reportedly operates on a budget of approximately $1.6 million (Int. 13).
68  
It is the author’s understanding that this budget funds all of the regional Conacs 
offices as well as the activities of the central office in Lima.  By comparison, 
Proalpaca, which operates in only three regions of the country, manages a budget that 
is two to three times larger than that of Conacs (Int. 14 2/9).
69    National Conacs 
representatives also worry that the decentralization process underway may lead to a 
fragmentation of financial resources among the regions, leaving the national office 
with insufficient resources to implement the initiatives that are underway (Int. 13 
2/23).  However, it is more likely that the regional Conacs offices will bear the brunt 
of funding shortages.
70 
Second, politically motivated replacement of Conacs’ leadership and technical team is 
a continual worry given the frequent turnover of officials within Minag and the coming 
2006 presidential election.  Under Toledo alone, there have been 5 Ministers of 
Agriculture.
71  The most recent replacement of leadership as of this writing occurred 
on February 25, 2005.  In the weeks following this development, Conacs officials were 
not worried about the possibility of changes within their agency; the new minister 
reportedly was not disposed to interfere with Conacs’ leadership or initiatives (Int. 
37).
72  Informants note that the change of government in 2006 may pose greater risks 
to the institution, since the new president will have obligations to supporters that will 
require new political appointments in the ministries.  Should there be attempts to 
replace Conacs officials with political appointees in the future, SPAR would attempt to 
protect the present leadership; however, it is quite questionable as to whether or not 
SPAR would have the political clout to affect such a decision.  IPAC and other 
Conalpaca participants might support Conacs as well, with the same caveats regarding 
their influence.
73 
Finally, Conacs has a limited capacity to shape policy and enforce agreements in the 
alpaca sector.  Conacs is a weak actor in relation to the industries.  For example, it 
does not have the ability to hold the industries to their commitment to participate in 
the National System for Collection and Commercialization of Alpaca Fiber when it 
comes time for them to buy fiber from the collection centers.  Conacs is aware that it 
cannot force the industries to follow its dictates, and it has wisely focused on gradual 
progress and open communication.  However, Conacs’ lack of authority as a regulatory 
institution is an impediment to pro-poor development in the alpaca sector.  
Conacs Puno.  Conacs’ Puno office is endowed with a small staff of about 14 and a 
communal office.  Its scant resources include a single vehicle for trips into the 
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countryside and outdated computer equipment.
74  Nevertheless, producers interviewed 
in Puno for this project assert that Conacs is essentially the only public institution that 
reaches small alpaqueros.  In fact, despite Minag’s directive against its agencies 
directly providing services, Conacs-Puno still extends some technical support to 
alpaqueros, such as consulting on animal management practices.  When questioned 
about this apparent discrepancy, Conacs-Puno representatives assert that Minag’s 
statutes do not explicitly prohibit them from engaging in these activities.  Further, 
they note the pressing need to bring services to small alpaqueros, given that no other 
institution exists, whether public or private, that could attend to this sector (Int. 37).  
Overall, Conacs-Puno highly condones the new national Conacs leadership, its 
technical team, and its policy initiatives.  However, there is another apparent 
disagreement between the national and regional offices in addition to the difference 
of opinion regarding the mandate of Conacs-Puno.  While the national headquarters 
envisions diminished regional offices in the future as decentralization proceeds, 
Conacs-Puno asserts its need for increased resources, given that this region is home to 
the great majority of the country’s alpaqueros.  Conacs-Puno would like to see 
changes in the formula by which regional resources are allocated to accommodate the 
greater demands on offices in regions with larger numbers of camelid herders (Int. 
37).
75   
Sistema Nacional de Acopio y Remate de Fibra (SNARF) 
As noted above, the National System for Collection and Commercialization of Fiber 
grew out of a joint initiative between Conacs, SPAR, IPAC, and the Ministry of 
Production to reduce reliance on intermediaries and liberalize the raw fiber market.  
SNARF is still in the early stages of development; the first experiences took place in 
2002 and 2003.  It has been co-financed by Conacs, IPAC, SPAR, and the Dutch 
international cooperation agency (Int. 13). 
In practice, the SNARF seems to embody a set of fairly loose recommendations for 
collection and sale of raw fiber intended to improve the position of alpaqueros in the 
production chain.  For example, Conacs has developed quality and classification 
standards in conjunction with IPAC that newly formed collection centers can adopt in 
an effort to provide buyers with fiber of m o r e  t r u s t e d  q u a l i t y .   M e a n w h i l e ,  e a c h  
region forms its own Committee for Collection and Commercialization of Fiber 
representing the major actors involved, including producers, the regional government, 
and NGOs, among others.  The Regional Committees may decide to follow Conacs’ 
recommendations, or they may instead devise their own solutions to the fiber 
collection and marketing problems.  Given the flexibility involved, each regional 
experience has been distinct.  In Junin, collection centers decided to negotiate sales 
directly with the industries (primarily Prosur); in Puno, several public auctions were 
held to market the raw fiber collected by eleven newly established centers.  
In the important case of Puno, several difficulties have hindered the success of SNARF 
initiatives.  During one of the recent experiences, IPAC failed to adequately 
coordinate with the Regional Committee and fell through on some of its commitments.  
For example, IPAC had promised to send experienced fiber classifiers from Arequipa to 
training sessions for workers in the collection centers, but the experts did not arrive 
on the arranged dates (Int. 40).  IPAC has, however, reaffirmed its promise to 
collaborate in future fiber classification training initiatives.  Second, the industries 
have not participated in the SNARF to the extent expected; they have sent few agents 
to purchase from the collection centers.  One underlying problem is that the 
industries are not yet confident that the fiber offered in collection centers is of the 
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quality purported (Int. 13).
76  Moreover, as discussed previously, the industries are 
reluctant to pay prices higher than what they have paid under the traditional 
marketing system, unless the fiber is of extraordinary quality.  And finally, the links 
between industry managers and intermediaries make the former reluctant to 
participate in a new marketing system partially designed to circumvent 
intermediaries.  The absence of the industries from the SNARF when it comes time to 
purchase fiber has generated further distrust toward them among producers in Puno.  
Overall, the SNARF does hold the potential to improve producers’ prices, although 
significant problems clearly remain to be resolved.  The new collection centers have 
received somewhat higher prices for fiber sold in their auctions (Int. 13, Int. 14 2/9, 
Int. 40).
77  H o w e v e r ,  s o m e  o f  t h i s  i n c r e a s e  m a y  b e  d u e  t o  s p e c u l a t i o n  b y  
intermediaries, who reportedly paid artificially high prices—higher than the industries 
were willing to offer—in order to maintain their role as exclusive suppliers to the 
industries (Int. 13, Int. 32).  It must also be kept in mind that the collection centers 
have managed to market less than 5% of Peru’s raw fiber.  As such, the SNARF is far 
from breaking the hold of the intermediaries and supplanting traditional marketing 
systems.   
Section 3: Alpaca Meat Sector 
As previously noted, alpaca (as well as llama) meat is an important source of income 
for small producers.  Around half of an average alpaquero family’s income may come 
from the sale of meat, both fresh and salted (charqui).  As such, there have been 
various efforts in the past to improve the situation of alpaquero families by focusing 
on development of the meat sector.  Conacs is presently working in this area as well. 
The main problems that limit market potential for alpaca meat involve sanitation 
issues on the supply side and strong prejudices on the demand side.  Small producers 
slaughter their animals when and where necessary, in the total absence of hygienic 
standards.  Most meat is traded on informal markets.  Significant quantities of alpaca 
meat travel from the highlands to markets as far as Lima, but there is no cold chain in 
transport.  Further, alpacas suffer from sarcocystosis, an internal parasite that creates 
cysts in the flesh.  Though not harmful to humans, sarcocystosis damages the 
appearance of fresh meat and is often confused with cysticercosis, which is a human 
health threat. 
The absence of sanitation and refrigeration in production and transport and the 
presence of sarcocystosis reinforce popular images of alpaca meat as dirty and 
unhealthy. These perceptions, combined with prejudices against alpaca meat 
consumption that are closely tied to pervasive racism in Peruvian society against 
indigenous people, make for serious difficulties in expanding demand for this product.  
Indeed, much of the alpaca meat sold in Lima is disguised as some other form of 
meat.  Immigrants to the city from the highlands who are accustomed to eating alpaca 
meat often conceal their consumption from the public.  
Previous interventions in the meat sector 
Most prominent among NGO efforts to promote development in the alpaca meat sector 
was Desco’s joint project with the Spanish agency for international cooperation 
(AECI).  Desco, an NGO with a history of involvement in the alpaca sector, shifted its 
                                                 
76Fiber is classified into four categories in the centers by the quality of the animal from which it originated, baby alpaca 
being the highest quality. 
77One informant estimates that nationally, fiber prices increased by 20% (Int. 13). Chapter IV: The Alpaca Sector 
44 
attention from fiber to meat in the late 1990s after concluding that there were too 
many structural obstacles to improving the situation of small producers in the fiber 
chain.  Desco received enthusiastic support from AECI to construct a state of the art 
slaughterhouse and meat processing plant in Arequipa.  Meat that was too infected by 
sarcocystosis to be sold as fresh cuts would be processed into secondary products in 
the adjoining plant.  Desco’s goal was to stimulate the meat sector by improving 
hygienic conditions and increasing supply volumes.  
 Both Desco and AECI had assumed that the limiting factor in the meat sector was 
supply, not demand—an assumption that was later recognized to be erroneous. The 
Arequipa project did manage to increase alpaca meat supply, but the plant and 
slaughterhouse were in practice heavily subsidized by AECI.  Desco attempted to 
promote alpaca meat among a number of buyers.  Most receptive were hospitals, 
which were convinced to purchase the meat based on its excellent nutritional 
characteristics of very high protein and low cholesterol, along with restaurants 
involved in the tourism industry.  It is noteworthy that numerous restaurants in 
Arequipa, Puno, and other regions of Peru today offer longs list of alpaca meat dishes 
on their menus.  However, Desco’s efforts to move beyond these two relatively small 
markets proved unsuccessful.  Spain ended its support for the operation, and the 
installations ceased to operate. 
Current initiatives involving the meat sector 
Despite Desco’s unsuccessful experience, efforts to promote production and 
consumption of alpaca meat continue, though they have a lower profile than efforts 
focused on the fiber sector.  These include research projects on sarcocystosis as well 
as initiatives by Conacs to promote fresh meat and to stimulate the dried meat sector. 
Sarcocystosis  research.  The FAO-Lima is currently funding a research project on 
sarcocystosis at the Universidad Cayetano Heredia.  This project was initiated in 2003 
and will continue through the end of 2005.  Senasa representatives assert that their 
agency would be ready to initiate a campaign as soon as a vaccine were discovered.  
However, progress on this front appears to be slow.  Controlling sarcocystosis could 
significantly improve prospects for marketing fresh meat.   
Fresh Meat Initiatives.  Conacs has been proceeding cautiously with plans to promote 
alpaca meat.  In contrast to the Desco experience, Conacs has begun by conducting 
research on the potential market for alpaca meat.  The agency commissioned a 
market study of Lima, completed in December 2004, which concluded that the 
greatest potential exists among upper income sectors to whom the meat could be 
marketed as a health product (Perez Ruiz et al 2005).  Accordingly, the potential 
market will be small.  Further, the price at which participants in the study were 
willing to purchase alpaca meat was low, falling below current production costs.   
Moreover, the study essentially overlooked the critical dimension of prejudice against 
alpaca meat.
78  The majority of housewives who participated in the study did not 
inform family members that they were consuming alpaca meat, and those that did 
tended to encounter resistance.  As such, obstacles to promoting the meat even in the 
niche upper-income market will be greater than anticipated.  Further, the state 
probably has a limited capacity at best to promote meat consumption.  Lack of 
resources and the absence of strong private interests in the sector to date probably 
preclude an effective joint public-private campaign of the sort that proved so 
successful for promoting the beverage pisco sour.  
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A potential international market for alpaca meat exists as well, but informants both 
within and outside the state seemed to agree that export is a far and distant goal (Int. 
12, Int. 4).  Sanitary conditions are still inadequate, and restrictions imposed by 
developed countries on meat imports are strict.  One informant noted that even the 
modern ostrich farms, which are equipped with slaughterhouses certified by Senasa, 
have not yet been authorized by foreign countries for meat export.  One factor does 
favor the eventual export of camelid meat, however: the southern region of the 
country, which includes Arequipa and Puno, has been certified as free of FMD.  
Small producers and fresh meat. There are several factors that limit the prospects for 
expansion of the fresh meat sector to benefit small producers.  First, the meat that 
has real market potential comes from animals of no more than two years of age, 
which are more tender and do not yet show obvious signs of sarcocystosis.  Poor, small 
producers will be reluctant to sacrifice young animals, particularly considering that 
camelids bear only one offspring per year.  Second, specialized larger producers may 
be most likely to benefit from the development of niche markets in Lima, as they will 
be better positioned to take advantage of these opportunities.  Further, niche markets 
may be small enough and sufficiently exigent in quality standards that they simply will 
not provide economic opportunities for the majority of small alpaqueros (Int. 13). 
Finally and most importantly, a key informant argues that meat is a significant income 
source for small producers only because of the price distortions in the alpaca fiber 
sector.  In his opinion, if raw fiber prices reflected their true market value, meat 
would represent only a small proportion of the alpaqueros’ total income (Int. 13).  
Fiber has far better economic prospects and a greater potential to benefit small 
producers en mass; therefore, he argues that efforts to benefit small producers should 
focus on the fiber sector.  The essence of the criticism is that alpaca fiber is too 
valuable a resource for the animals to be promoted as meat; cashmere goats and 
other fine fiber producing animals are not widely consumed for that very reason (Int. 
13). Consumption of llama meat, by contrast, is more rational, given that their fiber is 
generally of lower value.
79     
Overall, then, there are good reasons for promotion of fresh alpaca meat to take 
second priority to promotion of the fiber sector.  Meat should not be ignored, 
however, since small producers need to be able to benefit from their animals in a 
variety of different ways.  In particular, if genetic selection programs to improve fiber 
quality were to be widely implemented in the future, producing meat from young 
animals of inferior fiber quality could in fact be complimentary to fiber production 
(Int. 5). 
Charqui.  In contrast to fresh meat, stimulation of the charqui sector holds more 
potential to benefit small producers.  Charqui is not aesthetically damaged by the 
presence of sarcocistosis.  Sanitary issues are somewhat less pressing as well, given 
that the salting process kills organisms that could cause disease in fresh meat.  Older, 
less robust animals that would be undesirable for fresh meat can be turned into 
charqui.  Further, charqui production is not technically demanding; it is carried out by 
artisans throughout the alpaquero regions of Peru. For these reasons, a large 
percentage of small producers would stand to gain from charqui market expansion. 
Although most charqui is marketed informally, the state purchases a small but 
significant
80 amount through Pronaa, the national food assistance program.  In addition 
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to all of the nutritional advantages of fresh alpaca meat, charqui has the desirable 
property that it is non-perishable, which makes it an ideal product for Pronaa to 
purchase and distribute in bulk to families living below the poverty line. 
Conacs’ efforts to stimulate the charqui market have focused on two areas: pressuring 
Pronaa to purchase larger volumes of charqui, and lobbying for the exemption of 
charqui from the value added tax (IGV). The former efforts have not proven fruitful 
and probably do not hold much potential for success.  Pronaa’s purchase of meat has 
held roughly constant in recent years: 1,349 tons in 2003 and 1382 tons in 2004.  In 
response to a formal request by Conacs in 2003 that Pronaa increase its charqui 
purchases, Pronaa replied that its main objective is to acquire as much animal protein 
for distribution as possible with its given budget, and that fish products have the price 
advantage over charqui.  Accordingly, fish products make up 80% of Pronaa’s animal 
protein purchases.  Conacs argues that the state would receive a double social benefit 
by purchasing more charqui: it would help poor producers in the highlands as well as 
poor consumers in other regions.  Fish products, in contrast, are produced by large 
industries.  As of this writing, Conacs apparently had not achieved any progress with 
this argument (Int. 45 3/10, Conacs 2004b). 
 Prospects for exempting charqui from the value-added tax may be more promising, 
although the overall impact on the sector will be small.  Presently, although Pronaa is 
a state entity, it purchases charqui at a price that includes the 19% value-added tax, 
which is then turned over to the tax collection agency.  The tax increases the price 
Pronaa must pay for charqui, thus limiting the volume it can purchase.  Conacs, in 
collaboration with SPAR, has proposed that charqui be exempted from this sales tax 
and that the funds currently provided to Pronaa that end up as tax revenue be 
destined instead to the purchase of additional charqui.  That additional money would 
then end up in the hands of the producers.  
Conacs presented a number of justifications for this initiative in a report sent to Minag 
in 2004.  First were a variety of justifications based on small producers’ need for 
economic assistance.  Conacs noted the difficult climactic conditions in recent years 
that had led to high animal mortality, and the generally elevated levels of poverty.  
Conacs also argued that Pronaa purchases charqui at prices lower than the real 
production cost, once labor and indirect costs are taken into account. Second, and 
probably more convincingly from the point of view of the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance and Sunat, Conacs pointed out that charqui is processed by artisans; there are 
no large industries making significant profits that should be taxed.  Further, the tax 
revenue collected from Pronaa’s purchase of charqui is negligible: it amounted to only 
0.0068% of tax revenue for the previous year.  Conacs estimates that if this money 
(about $0.3 million) were instead invested in additional charqui purchases, it would 
increase the annual income of 80% of alpaquero families by about 5% (Conacs 2004b). 
An additional point should be made that was not included in the Conacs report: taxing 
a good produced exclusively by poor people does not make sense from the point of 
view of equity.  The World Bank (2004), for example, recognizes that “un-taxing” the 
poor should be an important item on the agenda of Latin American countries, given 
the extreme levels of inequality within their societies.   
The charqui exemption initiative seems to be moving forward, but slowly.  Conacs 
submitted its proposal to Minag in July of 2004, and Minag subsequently included 
charqui on a list of other agricultural and livestock products for which it is seeking tax 
exemptions.  This list was delivered to the MEF in December of 2004.  Conacs has 
apparently received no updates on the status of its proposal since that time, and it 
has recently sent a request to Minag asking it to solicit an update from the MEF.   
Securing approval from the MEF appears to be the most critical stage of the process; 
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should the MEF agree to exempt charqui, it seems that the initiative will easily 
become law (Int. 45). 
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CHAPTER V: STRATEGIC ENTRY POINTS 
This section first summarizes some recommended pro-poor public policies and then 
presents some strategies that may ultimately help to advance these policies and more 
generally to improve opportunities for small producers to benefit from expansion 
within the livestock sector.  The suggested agenda includes strengthening small 
producers’ associations, providing assistance for small fiber processing operations, 
promoting institutionalization and professionalization of state agencies, providing or 
pressuring the state to better fund agencies relevant to the livestock sector, providing 
or pressuring Conacs to allocate more funding to its Puno office, fostering 
coordination among actors involved in development efforts, and providing various 
form of support for decentralization.  The prospects for success of each course of 
action are discussed, taking into account political feasibility. 
Recommended Public Policies 
Four public policies mentioned in the previous chapters on the dairy and camelid 
sectors should be emphasized here: securing protection from subsidized imported 
dairy products in the free trade treaties for the milk sector, promoting direct 
marketing of alpaca fiber from producers to the industries, implementing standards 
for quality grading of fiber, and exempting charqui from the value-added tax.  These 
four policies are all well defined and fall within the realm of options available to a 
neoliberal, decentralizing state,
 81 although some important caveats exist regarding 
political feasibility.  
As discussed in Chapter III, the free trade treaty under negotiation with the US while 
research for this report was being conducted has the potential to harm the Peruvian 
dairy sector by flooding the market with cheap imported milk.  To prevent such a 
scenario, it would be reasonable for the Peruvian government to demand a clause in 
the treaty preventing the US from selling its dairy products at prices below those 
charged for imports from other countries, or, as suggested by milk producers, fixed 
quotas for the import of US milk products.  As previously noted, the US has been 
intransigent on the issue of its own subsidies for milk producers and its insistence on 
eliminating Peru’s variable tariffs, and the Peruvian government, for its part, has 
been intent upon finalizing the treaty.  As such, prospects for securing an anti-
dumping clause may not be good.  One expert, however, suggests that Peruvian 
producers could gain political leverage on this matter by asking the international 
organization Oxfam to carry out a campaign on their behalf similar to the one it 
conducted regarding West African cotton production.
82  Although the odds of success 
for such an initiative are not great, prices are such an important factor in production 
decisions that this policy alternative should be stressed.  A healthy and expanding 
Peruvian dairy sector is obviously critical for promoting pro-poor development for 
small milk producers.   
Turning to the camelid sector, the state is presently engaged in the second public 
policy—promoting direct marketing of alpaca fiber from producers to the industries—
through Conacs’ National System for Collection and Commercialization of Alpaca Fiber 
initiative.  As discussed in detail in Chapter IV, reducing dependence on the 
intermediaries is in the long-term interest of both producers and processing 
industries, although the intermediary-based marketing system has proved very 
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difficult to change.  The main obstacles to faster progress on this front are the 
continued strength of ties between the industries and the intermediaries on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, Conac’s weakness relative to the industries and its lack 
of authority as a regulatory institution. 
The third public policy worth stressing here, and closely related to the policy noted 
above, is the possibility of promoting uniform standards for grading the quality of 
alpaca fiber, a highly legitimate activity for the state even in the most neoliberal of 
policy environments.  A uniform standard could make it possible for alpaqueros to gain 
value-added by sorting fiber before sale to the industries, whereas at present, this 
option is less attractive because each industry uses its own classification system.
83  A 
uniform standard would also provide incentives for producers to improve quality.   
From a regional or even international perspective, it would not be difficult for Peru to 
set standards for grading since the country is a major producer of alpaca fiber.
84  And 
at least in theory, a national standard would be in the interest of the three main 
fiber-processing industries and could be advanced by the state as a cooperative 
project.  However, there are two main limitations on the feasibility of promulgating 
standards for grading fiber.  First, there is lingering resistance from the industries, 
which appear to value their autonomy in classifying fiber as each sees fit.  Second, as 
noted above, Conacs does not have the power to force the industries to comply with 
regulations.  
Finally, exempting charqui from the value-added tax and using the money saved by 
Pronaa to purchase additional amounts of dried alpaca meat for its nutritional 
assistance program would lead to small improvements in welfare for alpaqueros.  
Although the impact of such a policy would be limited, it should be easy to secure, 
since the case for the tax exemption is strong and the resources that would be lost to 
the tax agency are minimal.  Conacs is active on this front, although the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance has been slow to respond. 
Providing support for small producers associations 
Since small producers must ultimately be protagonists in the political struggle for pro-
poor development policies, strengthening associations that represent them is critical 
to the success of the FAO initiative.  The international community could further this 
goal by proving financial support and / or technical assistance for producers’ 
associations.  Such forms of support should be considered in particular for SPAR and 
the regional Fongales, given SPAR’s interest in organizing poor alpaqueros and the 
large number of small producers in the milk sector which the Fongales ostensibly 
represent.   
The SNV’s work with SPAR provides a model to be emulated in terms of technical 
assistance for producers’ association; it has helped SPAR’s central office design 
strategic plans and define organizational priorities.  The SNV’s efforts have not been 
sufficient, however.  SPAR needs additional support to help it gain influence within 
the camelid sector.  
First, SPAR, lacks the financial resources it needs to implement its plans, particularly 
its organizational initiatives (Int. 20). The weakness of SPAR’s links to regional and 
local alpaquero organizations is one of its greatest current limitations and must be 
overcome if SPAR is to become a more powerful actor.  Second, SPAR could benefit 
greatly from technical assistance at the regional level.  In the case of Puno, such 
assistance may be contingent on SPAR’s success in recruiting a more dedicated and 
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84Bolivia could be involved in deliberations as well. Chapter V: Strategic Entry Points 
50 
competent regional leadership; such efforts were underway at the time research for 
this project was conducted.  Overall, much work is needed in Puno to strengthen 
alpaquero organizations, encourage cooperation and coordination among them, and to 
improve their relationships with SPAR, the only association with the potential for 
effective action at the national level. 
There are no anticipated political impediments that would hinder donor efforts to 
strengthen organizations representing small producers; the greatest limitations will 
likely be the financial resources available for such initiatives.  Strengthening 
producers’ associations is a goal consistent with the stated policies of the current 
Toledo administration and enshrined in the Carta Verde.  Further, Minag’s statutes, as 
detailed in Decree 017, list strengthening producers’ associations as a key institutional 
object.  Conacs has a clear interest in strengthening SPAR, and Minag’s Dirección de 
Crianzas has demonstrated interest in working more closely with producers’ 
associations.  As such, there are allies within the state that would support the lines of 
action detailed above.  
Providing assistance for small fiber-processing industries 
Encouraging the emergence and consolidation of small fiber-processing industries 
would help to open up the alpaca fiber market, creating more opportunities for 
alpaqueros to sell their fiber, and in the long term, reducing their dependency on the 
three major processing companies in Arequipa.  Promotion of small fiber-processing 
operations would also help to create more jobs and opportunities in artisan garment 
production, which would help generate more value-added within Peru in the camelid 
sector.  In the long term, these steps could lead to improvement in welfare for the 
alpaqueros, who are some of Peru’s poorest rural producers.  As such, international 
institutions and donors should consider providing technical training and loans for small 
entrepreneurs interested in fiber processing.   
Again, this line of action should be quite feasible.  There should be no opposition from 
the Arequipa companies, since small fiber-processing industries will not directly 
compete with them.  The Arequipa industries produce high quality yarn, fabric, and 
garments destined largely for international markets, whereas emerging small 
industries will produce lower-quality materials for use by domestic artisans.
85 
However, several factors could limit the success of the strategy proposed here.  First, 
few entrepreneurs or producers’ associations have demonstrated interest in 
undertaking fiber-processing; Cecoalp in Puno is one of the few groups actively 
considering such as step, though it lacks the capital to do so.  Second, managerial 
skills and other human resources needed for such ventures may be rather scarce, 
particularly in Puno.  Efforts to promote small fiber-processing industries will 
therefore have to be undertaken with a long time-horizon in mind. 
Promoting institutionalization and professionalization of state agencies 
This report has identified instability and politically motivated turnover of ministers 
and other functionaries within public agencies such as Minag as a key limitation to the 
effectiveness of the state and its capacity to promote development in the agriculture 
and livestock sectors.  In accord with this report’s emphasis on possibilities for pro-
                                                 
85The Arequipa industries are also interested in providing yarn and fabric to artisan clothing makers.  In fact, IPAC, which 
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poor development in the camelid sector, Conacs should be at the center of efforts to 
promote institutionalization and professionalization. 
If Conacs is to succeed in articulating the alpaca fiber sector, promoting coordination 
among the actors involved, and ultimately improving the position of small alpaqueros, 
its leadership and personnel must be protected from politically motivated 
replacement.  As Conacs becomes increasingly effective and respected within the 
camelid sector (as has been the recent trend) and attains a higher profile, it may grow 
harder for politicians and political appointees to replace its functionaries, due to 
possible backlash from other actors in the sector, such as SPAR and IPAC.  However, in 
a country such as Peru, where politicians have strong incentives to award their 
followers jobs in the public sector, increased professionalism and effectiveness of an 
agency such as Conacs may not provide a guarantee against political interference.  
Vigilance by international actors will also be necessary.  The FAO, the donor 
community, and international lending institutions could help protect Conacs by 
strongly stating their desire for it to remain an independent and professional 
institution.  Should Conacs’ leadership and professional staff be threatened in the 
aftermath of the 2006 elections, international actors should use all means of pressure 
available to prevent replacement of its leadership and technical staff.   
In addition to promoting stability within Conacs, additional professional development 
programs and technical consulting services should be made available for its staff as an 
investment in human capital.  The SNV’s work in this realm has been exemplary and 
appears to be achieving excellent results.  However, little funding is available for this 
program, and its current agreement with Conacs will end in 2006.
86  
Another possible though probably less feasible line of action would be to encourage 
Conacs to seek IDB (or other international) financing for institutional strengthening 
programs.  The IDB frequently provides loans to state institutions in Peru for this 
purpose; it has carried out institutionalization projects with institutions as diverse as 
Senasa, the Congress, and the Presidency of the Ministerial Council (Int. 44, Int. 11).  
However, the IDB responds to the government’s priorities; it does not promote its own 
agenda (Int. 44).  As such, Conacs and Minag would have to convince the Ministry of 
Economics and Finances and the government that an IDB institutionalization program 
would be a worthy use of resources and external debt.  There is little chance for such 
a strategy to succeed under the current administration; future prospects will depend 
on the priorities of the next administration. 
Efforts must of course also be directed toward professionalization and 
institutionalization of Minag, since turnover of the minister is one of the key sources 
of instability within the ministry and the many agencies and offices responsible to it.  
Further, other offices within Minag could also benefit from technical assistance.  The 
German agency for international cooperation (GTZ) provides some such consulting 
services.  Although some of its programs with Minag have ended, it is still involved 
with the Agricultural Planning Office.  How e ve r,  t he  G TZ  is  m o r e  a ct ive  o n i s s ue s  
related to the coastal regions rather than the sierra (Int. 10). 
Another more general measure that could be taken is promotion of a ley de carrera 
pública to establish a professional civil service with merit-based procedures for hiring 
public functionaries.  Such legislation could help promote stability of functionaries 
and raise the qualifications of public employees.  Such a law was reportedly under 
consideration while research for this report was being conducted, although it was not 
expected to pass.  Feasibility of such a law will have to be reevaluated when the next 
administration takes power.  Given the structure of politics in Peru, however, passage 
of such a law will be difficult to secure.  
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In conclusion, an important caveat must be reiterated regarding international efforts 
to promote institutionalization and professionalization of state agencies: politicians in 
Peru have strong incentives to place their supporters in public agencies.  Peru shares 
this characteristic with neighboring Bolivia, and institutionalization efforts undertaken 
by the World Bank, the IDB and European cooperation agencies have largely failed in 
that country (Fairfield 2004).  The dynamics of job patronage in Bolivia are distinct 
from those in Peru; patronage politics in Bolivia may produce even stronger pressures.  
As such, the Bolivian experience may be only partially relevant for Peru.  In fact, the 
IDB’s institutionalization projects with Senasa have been far more effective than its 
similar projects with Senasag, the Bolivian equivalent.  That experience may provide 
some hope for future efforts, but the logic of job patronage must be taken into 
account when designing and initiating institutionalization programs.
87   
Providing or pressuring the state to better fund agencies relevant to the 
livestock sector 
Key public institutions active in the livestock sector need greater financial resources if 
they are to more effectively promote pro-poor development.  These state entities 
include Conacs, Iniea (its cuy programs in particular), and Minag’s Dirección de 
Crianzas.  International actors could help by directly proving funding for these entities 
and / or by pressuring the new administration that will take office in 2006 to prioritize 
these agencies and their livestock programs.  
Unless substantial external funding is available, securing more financial resources for 
these state agencies will be a difficult objective.  The feasibility of pressuring for 
greater resource allocation to these agencies will depend significantly on the interests 
and priorities of Peru’s next presidential administration.  Since Minag is unlikely to 
allocate additional resources to Conacs, the Dirección de Crianzas, and Iniea at the 
expense of its other departments, projects and agencies, a larger total budget for the 
ministry of agriculture would be necessary.  However, Minag has been of little priority 
for the Toledo administration.  Further, there are no organized interests that are 
influential enough to pressure the government to allocate more resources to 
institutions active with small producers in the camelid and cuy sectors.  
Providing or pressuring Conacs to allocate more funding to its Puno 
office 
The recommendation to better fund Conacs-Puno goes against the current consensus 
within Conacs’ central office, and is contrary to the opinions of key Conacs and SNV 
informants.  As such, it is presented for the sake of generating discussion and perhaps 
a reevaluation of present thinking regarding the role of Conacs’ regional offices. 
It is the author’s impression that Conacs’ Puno office has developed a significant and 
important, if necessarily limited, capacity to reach and assist alpaqueros that no 
other state agency—regional or central—or private organization—whether universities, 
businesses, or NGOs—can replicate for the foreseeable future.  The Conacs-Puno office 
appears to be an important reference point for producers’ associations, collective 
fiber enterprises, and even the regional government’s camelid project offices.   
Although Minag informants assert that service provision by a central state agency goes 
against current regulations and decentralization laws, it seems a folly to prohibit 
Conacs-Puno from providing technical assistance to alpaqueros, when no other actors 
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would presently be able to fill that vacuum.  The Puno regional government has no 
capacity to take over Conacs’ activities.  And building those capacities, while 
essential, will be a challenging and long-term endeavor.   
Downsizing the already small Conacs-Puno team and relocating its members to within 
the  Dirección  Regional Agraria, a strategy under consideration by Conacs central 
office, also seems highly inadvisable.  That line of action would merely diminish 
Conacs-Puno’s already limited resources and could conceivably create barriers to 
access for alpaqueros. This observation is based on the fact that institutional 
instability hinders effective coordination between producers and the state.
88   
Given these concerns, the most appropriate line of action would be to increase 
Conacs-Puno’s resources while simultaneously promoting greater coordination and 
interaction with regional government projects and the Dirección Regional Agraria.  
Any downsizing or reorganization of Conacs-Puno, as well as any transfer of its 
capacities, should be postponed until other institutions and actors can demonstrate 
their ability to effectively take over Conacs-Puno’s present responsibilities.     
It may also be advisable to increase the profile of the Conacs-Arequipa office, since 
the most powerful actors in the fiber sector—the industries—are located in this region.  
Industry representatives expressed frustration regarding Conacs’ frequent invitations 
to attend meetings and discussion tables that would require them to fly to Lima (Int. 
33).  In the words of one informant, having a strong Conacs’ presence in Arequipa is 
“elemental” (Int. 33).   To some extent, these complaints may reflect the industry’s 
lack of interest in actively engaging with Conacs.  However, maintaining a stronger 
Arequipa office could help to keep the industries more informed of Conacs’ initiatives 
and could stimulate enhanced interaction between the two. 
As far as other regional offices are concerned, Conacs’ strategic plans for downsizing 
and transfer of functions to regional governments may make more sense.  Again, the 
advisability of such plans seems contingent on the capacity of the regional 
governments, NGOs, and other private actors in the region in question to service 
producers’ needs.  
Fostering coordination among donor projects and between donor 
projects and state agencies 
Lack of coordination among international institutions that manage or fund 
development projects in Peru, duplication of efforts, and creation of organizations 
parallel to state agencies involved in similar activities are all problems that hinder 
efficiency.  Given the many different interests and agendas of the international actors 
involved, there may be little that can be done to reduce the existing problems.   
However, at the least, these problems should not be exacerbated. Rather than 
creating semi-independent project offices, i t  i s  r e co m m e nde d  t ha t d o no r s  a nd  t he  
FAO work closely with existing state institutions and coordinate efforts with 
international actors already involved with similar projects. 
International institutions engaged in projects of relevance for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative include the World Bank, the SNV, the GTZ, EU-Pasa, and to some 
extent the IDB.  The SNV and the GTZ are relevant because of their valuable work 
with Conacs, SPAR and Minag.  The EU-Pasa has funded PROALPACA, which will 
operate in two of the FAO prioritized regions, Huancavelica, and Ayacucho, until 2007.  
PROALPACA staff has acquired valuable experience on the ground in these regions that 
should not be lost.  The IDB is presently less active with institutions related to the 
livestock sector, although it has provided significant funding for Senasa projects. 
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Most importantly, the World Bank has recently approved funds to support a new 
Andean rural development initiative, the Proyecto Desarrollo Rural de la Sierra 
(PDRS), that will be coordinated out of the Presidency of the Ministerial Council 
(Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, PCM).  Similar to the FAO initiative, this 
project’s goal is to reduce poverty in Peru’s rural highland regions through integrated 
development projects, which will include initiatives directed toward alpaqueros and 
small milk producers.  The PDRS will focus on the poorest sectors of society and will 
strive to work closely with grass-roots organizations and regional governments (Int. 
11).  The 2002 background study also calls attention to the need to strengthen central 
and sub-national institutions and to promote participatory processes (World Bank 
2002).  Moreover, the PDRS will operate in three regions that have been prioritized for 
the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative: Cajamarca, Ayacucho, and Puno.  As such, it 
could be a critical ally for the FAO.  The PDRS will operate with 20 to 30 million 
dollars over a ten-year period.  The project currently has $1.1 million in donations 
from Japan, and a smaller funding counterpart has been allocated by the Peruvian 
government (Int. 11). 
Given the compatibility of the PDRS goals with the FAO livestock initiative, prospects 
for coordination are good.  The project’s General Coordinator asserts the importance 
of attention to public policy and of coordinating both public and private projects and 
initiatives underway in the sierra. Most importantly, he expressed his interest in 
coordinating with the FAO when the author informed him of the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Initiative (Int. 11).   
Support for decentralization  
If decentralization is to increase participation of socio-economically marginalized 
groups in decision making, improve prospects for equitable and efficient resource 
allocation, and, ultimately, promote sustainable development, flaws in the legal 
framework and other problems that have ari s e n i n p r a ct i c e  m us t  be  co r r e ct e d,  a s 
discussed in Chapter II.  The FAO and other international actors could help by calling 
attention to these issues, among them the need to form macro-regions, the 
importance of increasing resource transfers to regional and local governments 
(contingent on the development of capacity at these levels), and the need to clarify 
the functions of the CCRs.  The agenda should also include the following: providing 
technical assistance to regional governments, especially for functionaries involved in 
running the participatory budgets and designing the project proposals; providing 
support to help build the capacity of government institutions at the regional level, 
particularly in Puno where they are quite weak; and disseminating information to 
grass-roots organizations and producers’ associations on how to participate in the 
CCRs and participatory budget processes.  While similar actions need to be taken at 
the local level, this report recommends prioritization of the regional level, since 
planning at the regional and national levels is most critical to prospects for 
sustainable development in the livestock sector.  Last but not least, central state 
agencies must be strengthened, with emphasis on their capacity to provide support to 
the new decentralized agencies (Leonard 1982). 
A large number of domestic NGOs are already active around the issues of 
decentralization and participation.  Examples of reputable organizations include 
Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana and Participa Peru’s Vigila Peru project, a network of 
partners that monitor decentralization. They are working to disperse information to 
the citizenry on decentralization and the new opportunities for participation.  Another 
important NGO is Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER), a development organization 
which monitors transparency and participation in regional and local governments.  SER 
has offices in Ayacucho, Cajamarca and Puno, key regions for the FAO initiative.  This 
NGO has collaborated with Participa Peru’s Vigila Peru project.  The Swiss agency for 
international cooperation has also been active on decentralization issues, in Chapter V: Strategic Entry Points 
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cooperation with the Red de Alcaldes Rurales (Remurpe), a network of rural mayors 
that works to spread information regarding best practices for governance and has 
attempted to advance initiatives and reforms regarding the legal framework of 
decentralization from its office in Lima. Finally, the Centro Peruano de Estudios 
Sociales (Cepes) has shown interest in but lack of funds for conducting workshops with 
Conveagro and its member associations on regional budgets, the state of the 
agricultural and livestock sectors, and participation opportunities to influence 
decision-making at the sub-national level (Int. 15).
89  
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APPENDIX A: ALPAQUERO ASSOCIATIONS IN PUNO 
Puno has several hundred alpaquero associations that exist at least in name, but only 
a handful of these are of consequence (Int. 37 3/2).  The latter include SPAR, the 
Asociación de Criadores de Alpacas (Acricar), the Consejo Regional de Criadores de 
Alpacas y Llamas (Corepall), and to a lesser degree, the Asociación Regional de 
Criadores de Alpacas de Puno (Arcap).   
Conacs representatives in Puno assert that SPAR is the only organization that can be 
considered broadly representative of alpaqueros.  Good estimates of the percentage 
of alpaquero families in Puno who are affiliated with SPAR were not available, but 
informants asserted that the organization’s membership is growing.
90  V a r i o u s  
cooperatives and smaller alpaquero associations are members of SPAR, but SPAR does 
not have its own base associations in Puno.   
SPAR has experienced several problems on the ground in Puno.  First, its current 
regional leader has reportedly done a poor job during his tenure (Int. 37, Int. 42 3/3).  
Elections for a new regional SPAR representative were to be held at the end of March 
2005.  At the time of this writing, Conacs and national SPAR representatives were 
hoping to find more capable individuals, especially women, to run as candidates for 
leadership positions in Spar Puno (Int. 37, Int. 21).  Second, one informant in Puno 
who works with producers expressed a residual distrust of SPAR, stemming from past 
accusations of corruption and political manipulation against the organization (Int. 36).  
As such, further work will be needed for SPAR to overcome this past reputation.  
The remaining three regional alpaquero associations listed above are all reportedly 
quite weak in terms of membership and influence (Int. 37).  Corepall, Acricar and 
Arcap reportedly all compete with SPAR and among each other to represent 
alpaqueros in Puno (Int. 37 3/5).
91  Corepall is the larger of the three regional 
associations.  However, according to informants, it is closely associated with regional 
president Jimenez’s party.   Observers maintain that Jimenez has used Corepall to 
build political support for his government (Int. 37, Int. 43).  To the extent that this is 
the case, Corepall’s effectiveness at advancing the interests of alpaca herders may be 
diminished. 
In addition to the alpaquero associations, various collective alpaca enterprises exist in 
Puno.  These entities demonstrate both the potential and the limitations for 
associative fiber production.  The most noteworthy are the Central de Cooperativas 
de Servicios Especiales Alpaqueras de Puno Ltda. (Cecoalp) and Rural Alianza.   
Cecoalp is a cooperative enterprise (centro cooperativa autogestional) with 17 years 
of experience that buys and classifies fiber from about 1,500 families in alpaquero 
associations, cooperatives and communities.  Cecoalp pays the industries in Arequipa, 
primarily Grupo Inca, to process its fiber into tops and yarns (topes y hilados), which 
Cecoalp then sells to buyers in both Bolivia and Peru.
92  Cecoalp is also beginning to 
make some garments (prendas, tejidos a mano) with artisans in Juliaca.  Cecoalp 
reports that it has a good market for its products.  On the negative side, however, 
observers note that the enterprise has had management problems and occasionally 
poor leadership.  Cecoalp is seeking external financing to allow purchase of its own 
processing machinery, so as to avoid reliance on the industries and capture more 
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value added.  It also needs funds to train more fiber classifiers and to expand its 
volume of production.  Cecoalp would also like to open a center for alpaca breeding 
and genetic improvement, from which to distribute improved animals to alpaquero 
communities from which it buys fiber (Int. 36).
93   
Rural Alianza is a worker owned business (empresa de propiedad social) that employs 
200 workers and manages 40,000 animals (Int. 42).  It received land during Velasco’s 
agrarian reform and has been in operation ever since, more than 30 years.  Rural 
Alianza sells unclassified fiber to the industries in Arequipa and other buyers; its 
animals have a reputation for their high genetic quality.  Rural Alianza also sells 
reproducers to alpaquero communities that are interested in improving their herds.  
Rural Alianza has achieved its success by investing income from the export of live 
alpacas (Int. 37).  The business is able to maintain its own team of vets to attend its 
animals. Rural Alianza is also a member of SPAR.  
Cecoalp and particularly Rural Alianza can be considered successful production 
associations; however, they seem to be unique as such.  Although various association 
and community representatives have met with Cecoalp and Rural Alianza and 
demonstrated their interest in these models of organization, these experiences do not 
yet seem to have been replicated by other alpaqueros.  
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APPENDIX B: THE REGIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT: PUNO  
Given that the majority of alpaqueros live in Puno, any initiative designed to improve 
their standard of living must take into account the difficult political context in this 
region.  Puno has a reputation as one of the regions in Peru with the most political 
problems, including an unpopular and corrupt regional president and a potential for 
violent social conflict at the local level.  Both political parties and civil society are 
weak, and decentralization has been no panacea for improving government and 
spurring development. 
Political Parties  
Political parties in Puno are quite unstable and unrepresentative.  As is the case at the 
national level, the traditional political parties that collapsed in the 1990s have not 
been replaced by stable new political configurations.
94  The political landscape is 
instead characterized by a frequently changing kaleidoscope of national parties, as 
well as regional parties and “movements” formed to serve the interests of a few 
ambitious leaders.  In addition to regional parties, which include MARQA (Movimiento 
por la Reivindicacion Quechua y Aymara), the PDR (Partido Poder Democratico), and 
the FUP (Frente Unido Progresista) among many others,
95 local political movements 
are formed during campaign seasons for the sole purpose of electing a particular 
individual as mayor.
96  
None of these political groups enjoys broad popular support.  David Jimenez, who 
formed MARQA in 2002 through an alliance of several leftist parties and some 
elements of Fujimorismo (Int. 31),
97 won the regional presidency with a mere 26.5% of 
the vote, compared to 23.6% and 15.9% for the next two contenders (candidates from 
the PDR and the FUP respectively).
98  H o w e v e r ,  M A R Q A  d i d  v e r y  p o o r l y  i n  t h e  
provincial and district elections, winning only four out of a total of 108  district 
mayorships and no provincial mayorships at all.  Even in the province of Puno, the seat 
of the regional government, MARQA was not among the top five vote winners for 
provincial and district mayors (Diez Hurtado 2003:21).  These statistics clearly 
demonstrate the limits of MARQA’s popular support and representative capacity.  
Moreover, the shear number of registered political groups creates potential problems 
for governability.  The large number of candidates for provincial and district mayors—
between seven and 22 for the provincial positions in 2002—fragments the vote and 
makes it difficult for any mayor to be elected with anything approaching majority 
support (Diez Hurtado 2003: 20).  In four of Puno’s principal provinces (Puno, San 
Roman, Azangaro and Chucuito), for example, the provincial mayors were elected 
with only 14 to 23% of the votes cast (Diez Hurtado 2003: 21).  The absence of popular 
mandates at the local level is one factor that informants identify as contributing to 
the unrest that has ravaged several districts in recent years (see below).  
                                                 
94Whereas APRA remains an important party in many departments, it is quite weak in Puno. 
95More than 18 different political groups won provincial mayorships in 2002; of these parties, 11 were national and the rest 
were regional in scope (Diez Hurtado 2003: 54). 
96“The formula appears simple: a relatively popular individual is convinced by a group of supporters that s/he can be mayor, 
then, through personal and family networks, s/he builds a movement, creates and inscribes lists, and participates in the 
elections,” (Diez Hurtado 2003: 51).  “La formula parece ser simple: un individuo relativamente popular es convencido por 
un grupo de allegados de que puede ser alcalde, entonces, apartir de sus redes personales y su familia construye un 
movimiento, arma e inscribe sus lista… y se presenta en las elecciones.” 
97Int. 31 notes that MARQA in reality can be considered neither indigenous nor a movement.  Rather, it is a political alliance 
forged to gain power for its leaders.    
98The PDR, created in 1997, is also composed of politicians formerly connected to the left.  Statistics source: 
http://www.onpe.gob.pe/resultados2002/index.html Appendix B: The Regional Political Context: Puno 
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Civil Society  
Compounding the problem of weak and unrepresentative parties, civil society at the 
regional level in Puno is extremely weak.  As is the case throughout Peru, this 
condition can be traced to the experience of Fujimorismo in the 1990s with its logic of 
fragmenting and circumventing civil society organizations, and to the debilitating 
impact of Sendero Luminoso in the 1980s, which was active in the northern provinces 
of Puno.  In the 1970s and 1980s, Puno did have strong peasant associations and 
confederations involved in agrarian reform issues.  However, they have been greatly 
weakened, partly due to the end of agrarian reform and the decline of the traditional 
left parties to which they had links.  The peasant confederations now have little 
political influence, a condition that is shared by the alpaquero associations discussed 
in Appendix A (Int. 41, Int. 43).
99  Although Corepall does have links to MARQA, 
informants suggested that this alpaquero  association is more a tool of President 
Jimenez rather than an organization that serves to channel the interests of its 
members into the political sphere.  And as discussed previously, SPAR has much more 
presence at the national level than it does at the regional level in Puno. 
A wide range of NGOs are active around development issues in Puno, but they cannot 
be considered relevant political actors.  Most NGOs understandably avoid involvement 
with politics, which is almost universally viewed as corrupt and inefficient.
100  
Moreover, the regional branch of the Mesa de Lucha contra la Pobreza, which 
ostensibly coordinates the efforts of NGOs and other development actors and 
promotes integrated development plans, is on poor terms with the regional 
government, partly because the leaders of the Mesa and President Jimenez had been 
affiliated with rival political parties in the past (Int. 43).  President Jimenez has 
refused to collaborate with the Mesa, asserting that it has no representative mandate 
(Int. 43).  As such, the Mesa has no capacity to promote or enact the plans it 
develops.  In general, informants held poor opinions of the Mesa.  Comments ranged 
from assertions that it had no agenda for Puno to dismissals of the organization as 
totally irrelevant  (Int. 43, Int. 36, Int. 38).  
Alpaquero Associations in Puno 
Puno has several hundred alpaquero associations that exist at least in name, but only 
a handful of these are of consequence (Int. 37 3/2).  The latter include SPAR, the 
Asociación de Criadores de Alpacas (Acricar), the Consejo Regional de Criadores de 
Alpacas y Llamas (Corepall), and to a lesser degree, the Asociación Regional de 
Criadores de Alpacas de Puno (Arcap).   
Conacs representatives in Puno assert that SPAR is the only organization that can be 
considered broadly representative of alpaqueros.  Good estimates of the percentage 
of alpaquero families in Puno who are affiliated with SPAR were not available, but 
informants asserted that the organization’s membership is growing.
101  V a r i o u s  
                                                 
99However, Diez Hurtado (2003: 45), who also maintains that the peasant confederations have been weakened, nonetheless 
asserts that they “serve as an effective medium for social and political mobilization, a political trampoline that permits a 
few representatives to transcend the gremial ambiance and catapult into the municipal-districtal space.”  “El movimiento 
campesino se muestra como un medio efectivo de movilizacion social y politica, un trampolin politico que permite a algunos 
representantes trascender el ambito gremial y catapultarse por lo menos hasta el espacio municipal-distrital.”  
100SER (Servicios Educativos Rurales) Puno is one exception; this NGO is attempting to engage with the regional government 
t o  a  c er t a i n  d eg r ee i n  a n  ef f o r t  t o  p r es s  i t  t o  c o mp l y w i t h its decentralization obligations, which include participatory 
budgeting (Int. 43).   
101Conacs and SPAR representatives in the national office thought that SPAR had about 1,000 members in Puno, out of about 
40,000 alpaquero families. This figure seems too small, however.  Conacs-Puno informants, on the other hand, asserted that 
SPAR represents 80% of alpaquero families in Puno, which is probably a large overestimate.  Appendix B: The Regional Political Context: Puno 
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cooperatives and smaller alpaquero associations are members of SPAR, but SPAR does 
not have its own base associations in Puno.   
SPAR has experienced several problems on the ground in Puno.  First, its current 
regional leader has reportedly done a poor job during his tenure (Int. 37, Int. 42 3/3).  
Elections for a new regional SPAR representative were to be held at the end of March 
2005.  At the time of this writing, Conacs and national SPAR representatives were 
hoping to find more capable individuals, especially women, to run as candidates for 
leadership positions in Spar Puno (Int. 37, Int. 21).  Second, one informant in Puno 
who works with producers expressed a residual distrust of SPAR, stemming from past 
accusations of corruption and political manipulation against the organization (Int. 36).  
As such, further work will be needed for SPAR to overcome this past reputation.  
The remaining three regional alpaquero associations listed above are all reportedly 
quite weak in terms of membership and influence (Int. 37).  Corepall, Acricar and 
Arcap reportedly all compete with SPAR and among each other to represent 
alpaqueros in Puno (Int. 37 3/5).
102  Corepall is the larger of the three regional 
associations.  However, according to informants, it is closely associated with regional 
president Jimenez’s party.   Observers maintain that Jimenez has used Corepall to 
build political support for his government (Int. 37, Int. 43).  To the extent that this is 
the case, Corepall’s effectiveness at advancing the interests of alpaca herders may be 
diminished. 
In addition to the alpaquero associations, various collective alpaca enterprises exist in 
Puno.  These entities demonstrate both the potential and the limitations for 
associative fiber production.  The most noteworthy are the Central de Cooperativas 
de Servicios Especiales Alpaqueras de Puno Ltda. (Cecoalp) and Rural Alianza.   
Cecoalp is a cooperative enterprise (centro cooperativa autogestional) with 17 years 
of experience that buys and classifies fiber from about 1,500 families in alpaquero 
associations, cooperatives and communities.  Cecoalp pays the industries in Arequipa, 
primarily Grupo Inca, to process its fiber into tops and yarns (topes y hilados), which 
Cecoalp then sells to buyers in both Bolivia and Peru.
103  Cecoalp is also beginning to 
make some garments (prendas, tejidos a mano) with artisans in Juliaca.  Cecoalp 
reports that it has a good market for its products.  On the negative side, however, 
observers note that the enterprise has had management problems and occasionally 
poor leadership.  Cecoalp is seeking external financing to allow purchase of its own 
processing machinery, so as to avoid reliance on the industries and capture more 
value added.  It also needs funds to train more fiber classifiers and to expand its 
volume of production.  Cecoalp would also like to open a center for alpaca breeding 
and genetic improvement, from which to distribute improved animals to alpaquero 
communities from which it buys fiber (Int. 36).
104   
Rural Alianza is a worker owned business (empresa de propiedad social) that employs 
200 workers and manages 40,000 animals (Int. 42).  It received land during Velasco’s 
agrarian reform and has been in operation ever since, more than 30 years.  Rural 
Alianza sells unclassified fiber to the industries in Arequipa and other buyers; its 
animals have a reputation for their high genetic quality.  Rural Alianza also sells 
reproducers to alpaquero communities that are interested in improving their herds.  
Rural Alianza has achieved its success by investing income from the export of live 
alpacas (Int. 37).  The business is able to maintain its own team of vets to attend its 
animals. Rural Alianza is also a member of SPAR.  
                                                 
102The relationship between Corepall and Spar is unclear.  A Corepall representative asserted that their organization is in 
some way affiliated with SPAR (Int. 38 3/2).  However, Conacs assets that Corepall is not a member of Spar, but rather is a 
separate entity that competes with Spar to represent alpaqueros, although it is far weaker than Spar (Int. 37).  
103The author understands the buyers to be primarily small boutiques and artisans.  Cecoalp reports that Grupo Inca does not 
directly buy fiber from them because their quality standards are very demanding (Int. 36).     
104Cecoalp is receiving some assistance from the Italian government (Int. 36).  Appendix B: The Regional Political Context: Puno 
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Cecoalp and particularly Rural Alianza can be considered successful production 
associations; however, they seem to be unique as such.  Although various association 
and community representatives have met with Cecoalp and Rural Alianza and 
demonstrated their interest in these models of organization, these experiences do not 
yet seem to have been replicated by other alpaqueros.   
Decentralization, Participation, and Investment  
Although citizens had high hopes for decentralization, the institutional changes it has 
brought about have not led to significant improvements in terms of participation or 
transparency in Puno, at least at the regional level.  In addition, regional investment 
in agriculture and livestock remains low, partly due to incomplete implementation of 
the new institutional framework, and partly due to lack of resources. 
Participation spaces at the regional level have not functioned well.  The CCR does 
meet regularly,
105 and several organizations that represent the interests of small 
producers are members of the body.  These include Cecoalp and the Coordinadora de 
Organizaciones Campesinas e Instituciones Agrarias del Peru.  However, informants 
generally asserted that little is accomplished in this forum.  A Cecoalp representative 
for example maintained that the CCR in practice does not generate useful policies or 
development strategies and is primarily “una instancia de manejo politico.”   
Alpaquero  associations have not participated in the CCR.  Corepall for example is 
excluded from this space because it has not existed as a registered organization for a 
sufficient length of time (three years is the requirement).  SPAR Puno and the other 
alpaquero associations are absent from the CCR, partly, the author suspects, due to 
their own organizational weaknesses.  National SPAR representatives, however, assert 
that the association chose not participated in Puno’s CCR due to its highly politicized 
nature, as well as widespread government corruption (Int. 21).
106 
In contrast to the CCR, the regional government has never held a participatory budget 
hearing, despite the fact that it is legally obliged to do so by the decentralization 
legal framework (Int. 43).  President Jimenez has justified his neglect of participatory 
budgeting by pointing to the high levels of social conflict in the region, an argument 
along the lines that Puno is in a state of emergency that prevents the normal 
functioning of certain aspects of government (Int. 43).  Most observers view such 
arguments as transparent excuses for Puno’s authoritarian regional president to 
sidestep participatory mechanisms. 
Jimenez’s resistance to participation aside, the regional government in fact has few 
funds that could be allocated through participatory budgeting.  The regional 
government’s budget in 2004 was approximately $143.7 million.  Of that amount, 79% 
financed fixed costs (gastos corrientes), 14% was destined to provisional costs (gastos 
provisionales, which includes pensions for public functionaries), and only 7%—about 
$10 million—was available for investment (gastos de capital) (Sistema Vigila Peru 
2004: 7).  Of the $10 million, around 16% was earmarked for existing projects 
approved in previous years, leaving only about $8.2 million for new investments that 
could be allocated through participatory budgeting (Int. 43). 
Meanwhile, investment in the agriculture and livestock sectors remains remarkably 
low, particularly for a region such as Puno where these activities are so critical to the 
majority of the population.  In 2004, only 3% of the regional government’s investment 
funds, about $302,000, went to agriculture and livestock.  And of the money allocated 
                                                 
105The CCR met twice in 2004 according to Sistema Vigila Peru (2004: 18).  However, the “actas” have not yet been released 
/ drafted, so there is no public information available on the agenda. 
106SPAR does participate in CCRs in Ayacucho, Arequipa, Cuzco or Junin (Int. 21). Appendix B: The Regional Political Context: Puno 
62 
by the central government institutions to be spent that year in Puno for investment, 
only 8%, $969,000, was destined to agriculture and livestock (Sistema Vigila Peru 
2004: 8-9).  In total, then, investment in these sectors by the regional government and 
the central government institutions in 2004 was only about $1.3 million.  Resources 
destined to the camelid sector are of course also small.  The three programs funded 
by Pecsa received a total of $286,000 in 2004, while camelid projects run by Pradera 
received $199,000 (Gobierno Regional Puno 2004a).  Funding for the Pradera projects 
decreased to an anticipated $112,000 for 2005, whereas Pecsa funding increased to an 
expected $458,000 (Gobierno Regional Puno 2004b).  
Table: Regional Government Funding for Camelid Projects in Puno. 
Pecsa (Puno Regional Government):  2004 Budget:  Projected 2005 Budget 
Innovación y Transferencia Tecnologica de 
Camelidos Sudamericanos Domesticos  565,606 soles  1,000,000 soles 
Desarrollo Integral de la Alpaca  198,290 soles  526,169 soles 
Asistencia Tecnica en Manejo de Camelidos  190,000 soles  --* 
Pecsa Total:  953,896 soles  1,526,169 soles 
Pradera (Central Government):  2004 Budget:  Projected 2005 Budget 
Asistencia Tecnica y Capacitación en el 
Procesamiento de Chalona y Charqui en las 
Provincias de Azangaro y Huancane 
333,660 soles  374,260 soles 
Asistencia Tecnica y Capacitación en la 
Classificación de Fibra de Alpaca en las Provicias 
de Azangaro, Huancane Putina y Moho 
330,000 soles  --* 
Pradera Total:  663,660 soles  374,260 soles 
*These projects were not listed in the 2005 Puno regional budget.   
Sources: Gobierno Regional Puno 2004a, 2004b.  
Regional and Local Governments in Crisis 
Government at both the regional and local levels in Puno is weak, lacking in effective 
leadership, and often fraught by crises.  Puno’s regional government, in the words of 
one analyst, functions as simply one more mayorship within the province of Puno; it 
has little reach or authority beyond the capital (Int. 29).  Moreover, Jimenez’s 
government has been rocked by allegations of corruption involving the misuse of 
emergency relief funds for children impacted by freezing spells (friajes).  This 
scandal, combined with Jimenez’s authoritarian style and generally ineffectual 
government, has made him extremely unpopular.  Yet given the absence of effective 
mechanisms to demand accountability, the weakness of civil society, and the lack of 
any strong leaders at the regional level who could challenge him, Jimenez is likely to 
finish out his term (Int. 43).   
Meanwhile, Puno’s prospects for social, political and economic development have 
stagnated, giving way to generalized discontent.  Residents of Puno are extremely 
disillusioned, not only with President Jimenez, but with politicians, political parties, 
and decentralization in general.  Decentralization generated high hopes, but its 
inability to solve the region’s many problems during its first several years of 
implementation has created great disappointment.  Informants assert that essentially 
no political actor in Puno has a real agenda for regional development or the ability to 
bring about much-needed coordination at the regional level (Int. 43, Int. 31).  In the Appendix B: The Regional Political Context: Puno 
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absence of real progress on these fronts, drug trafficking continues to grow in Puno.  
The region’s location adjacent to Bolivia facilitates this illegal commerce.  And while 
the livestock and agricultural sectors stagnate, coca growing in the northeastern 
lowland region of Puno attracts campesinos with its prospects of far greater earnings.  
These problems have contributed to a series of intense localized political crises that 
have arisen throughout Puno since 2004.  The crises are characterized by popular 
protest incited by accusations against mayors of authoritarianism and corruption—a 
term which popularly refers to a wide range of offenses, from poor governance, to 
resistance to citizen participation, to mismanagement of funds and outright corruption 
(Int. 31).  The worst instance of these conflicts occurred in April 2004 in the province 
of Ilave, where after days of demonstrations, a crowd of protesters assassinated the 
mayor.  Informants agree that local power groups—for example, political opponents of 
the mayor—are manipulating popular discontent to produce these potentially violent 
protests (Int. 31, Int. 43, Int. 41).  One informant asserts that these local crises have 
become “instutionalized” in Puno (Int. 43).  The promise of special attention from the 
regional as well as the central government, and the possibility of receiving external 
resources from the latter, as ultimately occurred in Ilave (Int. 43), may motivate 
discontented groups in other districts to follow similar protest strategies against 
unpopular mayors.   
Some informants view the local participation spaces created by decentralization as 
mechanisms that could help to reduce the conflict between mayors, their political 
opponents, and the citizens.  Experiences of local level participation in Puno seem to 
vary greatly across municipalities, both between and within rural and urban 
districts.
107  Informants note that the success of CCLs, for example, depends 
significantly on the attitude of the presiding mayor (Int. 41).  Participatory budgeting 
also takes place at the local level, although once again, the resources available are 
quite limited.  In general, the growth of demands at the local level is outstripping 
increases in the transfer of resources to the municipalities (Int. 43), and this problem 
does not bode well for resolving local conflicts.  Further, the complexity and 
inconsistencies of the Ley de Municipalidades that set forth the new institutional 
structure at the local level create problems that contribute to the conflicts (Int. 43, 
Int. 31).  For example, many of the mechanisms of accountability established are 
extremely difficult to enact in practice; they involve too many complicated 
bureaucratic procedures (Int. 31).  Further, mayors were given so much power that 
there is intense competition for the office (Int. 43).    
So far, Puno’s municipal conflicts remain highly localized.  There appears to be no 
relationship between conflicts occurring in different districts, and the crises have not 
reached up to the regional level.  Yet they are clearly a cause for great concern, 
particularly given the experience of Ilave.  Informants worry that discontent with the 
status quo in Puno may reach such extremes that small radical groups may be able to 
incite further violence.  There have even been speculations that former members of 
Sendero Luminoso were involved in the Ilave incident (Int. 41), although no clear, 
generally accepted understanding of those events has yet emerged.  Over the last 
three years, prisoners accused of involvement with Sendero Luminoso in fact have 
been released and have returned to northern Puno, where the movement had been 
strong in the 1980s.  Opinions regarding the significance of their return vary.  One 
informant attests that several ex-Senderistas have risen to positions of leadership in 
districts in the north in recent years and have assumed a radical discourse.  His worry 
is not that these ex-Senderistas will advocate the policies of systematic violence from 
the past, but that their radical discourse could stimulate violence in the context of 
widespread social discontent.  Another informant downplays the potential threat from 
these former prisoners, asserting that many of them were probably falsely accused, 
                                                 
107One informant asserts that there has been more participation in rural municipalities than in urban ones (Int. 43). Appendix B: The Regional Political Context: Puno 
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and that Sendero will not reemerge as a political force in Puno, given its solid defeat 
in the 1990s (Int. 43).  At any rate, informants do agree that the potential for violent 
conflict will remain in Puno unless progress can be made at making politics more 




The issues discussed in this section do not bode well for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Initiative as it relates to Puno.  Many of Puno’s problems, such as lack of state 
capacity at the regional level, a shortage of resources, and a weak civil society are 
common throughout the Andean regions.  However, Puno represents a worst-case 
scenario, with its weak regional government and its penchant for conflict at the local 
level.  It is also important to recognize the fact that the long history of involvement 
by NGOs promoting rural development in Puno has not achieved results of any 
significance from a region-wide perspective.
108  If there is to be true development in 
the alpaca sector, there must be more effective participation in decision-making and 
better coordination of efforts at the regional level.  Yet the problems discussed in this 
section constitute serious structural impediments to those prerequisites. 
 
                                                 
108To a certain extent, the EU’s decision not to implement Proalpaca in Puno should also be taken as a warning regarding the 
difficulties of operating a development initiative in this region.  
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